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# West Europe Report

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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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## PAH-1 ANTITANK HELICOPTERS BEGIN SERVICE

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Feb 81 pp 81-82

[Text] December 4, 1980, marked a cornerstone in the history of the army's airborne troops: MBB, as general contractor for the PAH-1 weapons system, presented the troops with the first antitank helicopter which had come off its production line in Celle. This date is also significant because the airborne troops, until now a combat support troop, are now receiving an element which makes them a part of the combat units. This article describes the weapons system, its production program, the antitank helicopter troops, and their concept for deployment.

When the army decided at the beginning of the 1970's to introduce an antitank helicopter to complement its ground antitank forces, it became apparent that all requirements, especially the requirement for night deployment capability, could not be fulfilled within the planned timespan, i.e. by 1979.

For that reason, it was decided in 1975 to equip an existing helicopter with an already existing weapons system and to introduce it as PAH-1. In other words, it was decided to equip the army's liaison and surveillance helicopter (VBH), which had been developed from the civilian BO-105C, with the guided antitank missile HOT, which is a product of German-French collaboration. Because of higher military requirements, engine, gears, rotor components and rear engine drive were more powerful than in the civilian model. An unbreakable fuel system and landing gear with increased energy consumption offer greater safety. To facilitate maintenance, parts having a limited lifespan were replaced with parts which would not wear out. The need for maintenance in the field, the additional electronic equipment, and the HOT weapons system required additional changes from the original civilian version.

The electronic equipment includes the following radio and navigation devices: A signal and intercom installation and 2 VHF/FM transmitters, AN'ARC-114G made by Becker with a Sylvania license; one UHF/AM transmitter, the XT-3010 made by Rohde & Schwarz; the light doppler navigation system, AN/ASN-128, made by SEL under a Singer-Kearfott license; the AN/ARN-89 gyroscopic direction indicator made by Sperry with the course bearing indicator made by AOA Gauting and the STR-700/375 and the code signal device by Siemens. In addition, there is the FRG-19 Yaw regulator by BGT.

The guided missile system HOT belongs to the second generation of antitank weapons, i.e., it is characterized by a semi-automatic IR wire guidance. External characteristics of the PAH are the stabilized sighting and navigation installation which projects upward from the roof of the cockpit as periscope, and a carrier with three launching pads each on each side of the cockpit. Each PAH-1 is therefore equipped with six missiles. Fully armed, the helicopter has the following weight:

Fully equipped helicopter with pilot and gunners	1,458 kg
HOT system	194 kg
HOT system (6 HOT guided missiles)	192 kg
Fuel	456 kg
Weight (normal)	<hr/> 2,300 kg

During a demonstration in Munster, the HOT's lack of smoke, as opposed to the MILAN, as well as the 100-percent accuracy of fire with 6 shots, were impressive. This may of course have been a matter of luck, but the manufacturer confirms that during testing with 400 shots, an approximately 95 percent accuracy had been achieved. The HOT has a range of 400 to 4,000 meters. With 4,000 meters, flying time is 17 seconds.

#### Production Plans

It is rare that a secretary of state can praise a general contractor because he has remained within the projected budget. But Dr Wilfried Penner did just that in his first speech in his new capacity on occasion of the helicopter's introduction in Celle; to be sure, it was low key rather than enthusiastic, but at any rate.... And it was the truth. Based on a need for 212 helicopters--3 regiments with 56 helicopters each and one squadron with 21, plus a replacement reserve of 1 percent over a 12-year period--cost estimates in May 1973 amounted to DM 676 million.

At the end of the planning phase on 31 December, 1975, the military/technical deadline, costs had risen to DM 810 million, which represents an annual increase of 6.6 percent. At the end of the definition phase, when military/technical/economic requirements were established, costs had increased by 6 percent, to DM 858.6 million. This amount was presented to the house committees in May and June, 1977, distributed over fiscal years as follows:

1977	DM 80 million
1978	70 million
1979	120 million
1980	150 million
1981	438.6 million

On 31 October, 1980, the day the permit was given, costs had risen to DM 922 million. This represents an annual increase (over 3 years, 10 months) of only 1.9 percent as opposed to the definition phase, which is far below the rate of inflation.

The PAH-1 is primarily a German multicorporation product. MBB, as main contractor, has 39.8 percent of the DM 922 million business. This amount contains 1.5 percent for special tools, 8.6 percent for MBB subcontractors such as Boehler (0.8 percent) for Titan rotor hub; Mainz Precision Tool Works (1.7 percent) for the double hydraulics of the main rotor control; Friedrichshafen gear wheel factory (3.4 percent) for rear, intermediate and main drive; Henschel Aircraft (1 percent) and Siemens (0.8 percent). Some 14.2 percent go for materials for MBB, such as Bodenseewerk Geraetetechnik (0.9 percent), Liebherr Aerotechnik (0.8 percent), ZF (0.75 percent). The engine is divided between Allison (4.7 percent) and MTU (3.2 percent). The avionics was added. Avionics manufacturers are also direct BWB contractors. They take up 10.7 percent of the total cost. This includes direct deliveries from the United States (0.7 percent); becker-Flugfunk (2.5 percent), Rohde & Schwarz (2.4 percent), Siemens (1.8 percent), AOS (0.7 percent) and SEL (1.1 percent). The HOT weapons system takes up 17.3 percent of the total cost. DM 100 million for the infrastructure must be added to the DM 922 million. An ammunition supply of 40 HOT is planned for each helicopter. It is assumed that 2 LFK per helicopter per year will be needed for practice firing.

#### The Supply

Three antitank regiments with 2 squadrons each for every 28 PAH, and an additional squadron with 21 PAH, divided into 3 troops with 7 PAH-1 each, are being formed in the 6th mechanized infantry division in Schleswig-Holstein.

The antitank regiments are assigned to the three corps and there belong to the airborne troops detail as part of the corps troops under the airborne troops commander, who also has a medium helicopter transport regiment with CH-53 and a light helicopter transport regiment with UH-1D at his disposal.

The antitank regiments are being stationed in Celle (Regiment 16), Fritzlar (Regiment 26) and Roth (Regiment 36). The 6th division squadron will be in Itzehoe. It is part of a mixed paratrooper regiment, together with a surveillance and liaison squadron (15 VBH), and a light transport squadron (24 UH-1D). At the end of 1980, 38 PAH-1s had been delivered to the army, 23 of which are being used for training at the academy for paratroopers in Bueckenburg.

#### The Deployment Concept

The present plan--one must speak of present, because larger antitank division do not exist as yet and therefore could not yet practice--is to place the airborne antitank regiment at regiment disposal in the range of corps. In case of an attack large enough to justify the use of antitank helicopters, they will be assigned in the necessary strength to cooperate with the respective division or brigade. The squadron or troop advances them to the division's forward assembly area; the squadron's captain will fly to the division commander or his G-3 for

a briefing on the mission. In the past, when the paratroopers could only train in troop strength, because there were so few of them, it often led to misunderstandings because the troop leader--he also had to take on the role of squadron captain--reported to the division command post. This meant that his troop was without a leader for a long time, because the troop leader still had to go to the brigade. The forward assembly area consists in general of the command post and three supply areas, where the helicopters can be armed and fueled. They are supplied by air.

With the brigade, the troop leader will be briefed directly by the brigade commander, while his troop flies to a forward meeting point which is 5 to 10 flight minutes from the area of operation. After his return, the situation is discussed "squatting in the forest," and the individual helicopter pilots are briefed, contact is made with the battalion which has already made contact with the enemy, in order to cooperatively engage the enemy tanks. The helicopters always fly over their own territory. As shown in the sketch, they thus remain outside the range of one of their main opponents, the ZSU 23-4 tank equipped with anti-aircraft canon.

This concept is based in part on the PAH-1's limited flight time, but it is also thought that this defect is not that critical because rearming will probably become necessary before refueling.

#### Training

Retraining for the new helicopter model takes place at the academy in Bueckeburg and the tactical training at the experimental squadron in Celle. The following is part of tactical training: learning the flight profile, especially during the PAH's formation flying, training of commander and gunners as well as firing practice at either Munster or Bergen-Hohne.

#### Summary

The army has begun to include the third dimension in its antitank forces. In contrast to the already existing antitank systems, the PAH-1 offers the following: 1. can engage the enemy at great distance while outside the range of enemy anti-aircraft weapons; rapid changes in concentration of forces independent of obstacles on the ground.

It still lacks the capacity to engage the enemy at night (it is capable of night flight), longer flight time and the ability to carry more weapons.

9328

CSO: 3103

## LABOR PARTY CONGRESS REJECTS TNF STATIONING

## Resolution on Nuclear Weapons

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 2 Mar 81 p 3

[Excerpt] Amsterdam, 2 Mar--In important branches, the PvdA [Labor Party] Congress resolved last Thursday, Friday and Saturday in Amsterdam on the following:

## Nuclear Weapons

In its nuclear weapons section, the PvdA advocates inducing NATO to take steps towards a drastic reduction of short range nuclear weapons, aiming at the reciprocal abolition of these weapons in Europe. The PvdA also does not want any new medium range nuclear weapons in Europe or weapons which shift the boundaries between conventional (nonnuclear) and nuclear weapons systems (such as the neutron bomb). The resolution then continues: "The Netherlands is a critical NATO member for invigorating and encouraging a policy outlined for this purpose. The Netherlands must become free of nuclear weapons, but in such a way that it brings closer a Europe free of nuclear weapons, which at the same time implies a declaration of principle to achieve the denuclearization of the Netherlands' territory and armed forces. Therefore the Netherlands will take the following steps unilaterally in the next cabinet term, even if discussion with the allies should produce little or nothing:

1. No introduction of nuclear weapons systems or of risks with both conventional as well as nuclear branches;
2. No stationing on Netherlands territory of new medium range systems (cruise missile and Pershing II) assigned to the Netherlands by NATO.
3. Elimination of short range nuclear weapons incorporated in the Netherlands armed forces.



4. "Immediate beginning of discussions about reduction of the nuclear branches to be operated by the Netherlands to one, at the most, two. The abolition of four to five nuclear branches will be effected in 4 years."

Comments by Den Uyl

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 2 Mar 81 p 3

[Text] Amsterdam, 2 Mar--"The real fight against nuclear weapons is only beginning. But some tension seems to be reviving. Brezhnev's proposals are remarkable and offer genuine points of contact.

J.M. den Uyl, who was definitely confirmed Saturday as leading PvdA candidate, called on his whole party with these words to help to convert the disarmament steps adopted at the election congress into government policy. He thereby condemned the official Netherlands' reaction to Brezhnev's proposals: "a reaction which was characterized with the words, naively amiable."

Den Uyl pointed out that CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] leading candidate, Van Agt, perhaps was correct in describing the PvdA nuclear weapons strategy as ripe for escape from NATO. But he argued that the congress and the PvdA understand the function of authority. "We are not antiAmerican, but very concerned about what the United States under Reagan is doing, especially in Latin America, Den Uyl added, while being applauded.

In his final speech to the congress, the PvdA leader said he was aware of having asked much from the party, with that alluding to his reservations about the party's nuclear weapons position. No one must think that I was unaffected emotionally, according to Den Uyl: "I am not made of concrete and I am not ashamed to say that. I do have a conviction and a responsibility." He promised the congress, on his part, he will carry out the program decided upon.

Den Uyl called Weerwerk a "program for survival" against the tidal wave of discouragement. He does not blame that completely on the Van Agt/Wiegel cabinet, but still in his opinion that cabinet has been negligent in doing what it was bound to, in view of the need of the moment. He fiercely opposed the revival of unbridled economic liberalism, according to the ideology of the American economist, Milton Friedman and he warned against the attack which is being launched internationally as a broad front against the welfare state and social security.

The PvdA wants to get out of "the morass of inertia and defeatism by again offering people work and hope. It is confident that economic growth is possible. Therefore the party asks the mobilization of all reserves, less consumption and more investments. It also

asks for sacrifices of income and management of capital, investment and income. Den Uyl added to that: "Fight to protect the social minimums, whereby even here it applies that no one is bound to the impossible. But in that case, we speak to each other again as a party."

It depends on you and me whether we get the chance to carry out our program, Den Uyl impressed on his congress. "If you want it, it is no fairy tale. That can only happen if we believe what we say and do what we say."

8490

CSO: 3105



**ENI ACTIVITIES IN SICILY SUMMARIZED**

Rome POLITICA ED ECONOMIA in Italian Feb 81 pp 44-45

[Text] ENI's activities in Sicily are closely linked to the development of those sectors, like energy and chemistry, which constitute the agency's priorities, representing also fundamental issues not only for the ENI group but for the Italian economy as a whole.

In fact, the constant flux and the level of the investments made and of those planned show the importance that the investments in Sicily carry in the general overview of the ENI group activities in Italy. In 1979, in fact, with a volume of investments greater than 185 billion lire, Sicily ranks first among the various Italian regions as far as the flux of investments is concerned, thus consolidating the preeminence at a national level of the total volume of the group's technical commitments which, at the end of 1979, represented about one-fifth of the productive assets of the ENI group in Italy.

**Support of the Employment Levels**

Just as significant are the figures concerning the levels of employment, which have exceeded 7,000 workers, of whom about 5,000 are in the chemical industry.

Taking into account the overall difficulties of the chemical sector and the situation throughout large industry in Italy, ENI's commitment for the support and the development of employment, constantly over 7,000, stands out.

**Expected Investments for Over 670 Billion Lire for the Period From 1981 to 1985**

The investment program and the initiatives planned for the period from 1981 to 1985 definitely confirm this tendency.

This is also due to the fact that ENI's development of initiatives and commitment has always been positively supported by the presence and collaboration of the region, of the regional economic agencies and communities.

For the period from 1981 to 1985, in fact, investments of more than 310 billion lire are planned for the chemical and oil refining sectors, greater than 190 billion for the transportation and distribution of natural gas, 117 billion for mineral research, of 51 billion for the distribution of petroleum products.

This involves a volume of investments of 670 billion lire, in addition to the investments which are being defined, in particular for the new initiatives in the Belice Valley, and for putting into effect the program to determine the potential of bituminous rocks in south central Sicily.

#### Renewed Research on Hydrocarbons on Land

ENI's current and planned initiatives have numerous features of interest not only for Sicily but for the entire national economy. In the energy sector there is, first of all, renewed research on hydrocarbons on land, which will avail itself of technologies and the experience gained by AGIP [National Italian Oil Company] during these years in Italy and abroad.

New systems of retrieval from deposits in Gela and Ponte Drillo are already functioning. Presently, crude oil from Sicily's land and sea deposits contributes over 50 percent to the national production of the ENI group.

#### Methane Pipeline Connection to the Continental Network Completed

The completion of the methane pipeline for importation of natural gas from Algeria and its connection to the already existing methane pipeline network will secure, as far as Sicily is concerned, not only the immediate utilization of large quantities of gas, but also a substantial increase in the availability of a highly valuable and versatile energy source.

With the recent completion of the portion Gagliano Calderari (Enna)-Messina, Sicily has been connected with the continental network of methane gas pipeline, thus receiving a new energy supply.

SNAM [National Gas Pipeline Company] is, among other things, committed to set aside for the Sicilian consumer market up to 30 percent of the annual supply of Algerian gas.

A new company, Siciliana Gas, has already been established, jointly with EMS, to manage the construction and the operation of networks for the distribution of natural gas in Sicily for civilian, commercial and small industry use within the metropolitan areas.

Also the initiative taken in cooperation with the Fund for Southern Italy and the Technical Physics Institute of Palermo University to maximize the use of methane and to rationalize consumption in the south must be emphasized.

#### Rationalization and Coordination of the Chemical and the Employment Sectors

In the chemical sector, the government has given ENI the task of restoring SIR [Industrial Group] and Liquichimica. It is a commitment of great responsibility, not only as far as the future possibility of recovery for the entire national chemical sector is concerned, but also with respect to the integration of technical-productive and commercial activities with those of ANIC [National Agency for the Hydrogenation of Fuel]. This commitment also involves a renewal of the collaboration with Italian and foreign operators. The recovery and rebound of Augusta based Liquichimica's productive activities and the continuation of the initiatives jointly held with Montedison (ICAM for the Priolo cracker) can be viewed in this context.

In particular, with respect to the Gela and Ragusa plants, which constitute one of the fundamental chemical poles for the chemical activities of the ENI group, a program has been in existence for some time aiming at the rationalization and qualification of productions and, therefore, at creating better conditions in revenue and economic solidity, in relation to price increases of oil and other raw material, and to the entry in the field of basic chemistry of new operators, among them numerous oil producing countries.

In this context it is necessary to mention the programs directed at strengthening the refining operations at Gela, for which about 60 billion lire are presently being invested. It must be stressed, in particular, that Gela's refining facilities are fully integrated with the AGIP oil-producing cycle. In fact, a 16-percent increase in the quantity of oil refined was already registered in 1979.

As far as refining is concerned, ENI's action for a more rational coordination of the sector, in line with the orientation of national energy policies, has determined the acquisition of the majority of the stocks of SAROM Finanziaria. ENI's role in providing energy to the country and the well-established presence of the agency in the international community are the best guarantees for the eventual participation in the refinery of the Milazzo Mediterranean company of dealers having their own oil availabilities.

This brief overview of ENI's initiatives in Sicily brings out the close linkage existing between these activities and some of the main economic sectors of the entire national economy, and to such an extent to make it necessary that there be a constant synthesis between business opportunities and choices in the economic policy at regional and national levels.

In this context, a necessary element of completion is constituted by the conventions recently stipulated between ENI and the Sicilian Region for the protection of the environment.

9758

CSO: 3104

## DELAYS IN METHANE PIPELINE NETWORK IN SICILY DEcriED

Palermo GIORNALE DI SICILIA in Italian 27 Jan 81 p 14

[Article by Salvatore Parlagraeco: "Will the Methane Pipeline Be Installed When Methane Becomes Available?"]

[Text] If petroleum was the primary cause for the miracle of ENI's [National Hydrocarbons Agency] coming to Sicily, (ENI is about to begin a vast 160 billion lire hydrocarbon research project on the island), methane is the most concrete vehicle and the last chance to raise the island to advanced industrial levels, thereby providing Sicily with enormous energy possibilities. Sicily is preparing to be a potentially rich region. But what about the Sicilians?

The meeting between the region's president D'Aquisto and ENI President Alberto Grandi resulted in methane being singled out as of primary importance. Neither petroleum research nor chemistry are given such importance as to bring about a socioeconomic turn of such significant proportions. With the recent completion of the Gagliano Calderari (Enna)-Messina pipeline tract, Sicily has been connected with the continental network. SNAM [National Gas Pipeline Company] has committed 30 percent of the total Algerian gas supply for the Sicilian market. Yearly availability of ENI methane earmarked for internal consumption will increase from 27 to 40 billion cubic meters, which is equal to 47 percent of national production, 22 percent of Dutch, 20.6 percent of Soviet and 9 percent of Libyan deliveries.

By 1981 Sicily will be able to count on the first delivery of Algerian methane, albeit in reduced quantity.

What steps have been taken to exploit the new energy source? ENI set up the Societa Siciliana Gas, with ENS coparticipation, to build and maintain an urban distribution network for civil, commercial and small industry use. A study by the "Cassa," commissioned by the Institute of Technical Physics of the University of Palermo has the task of optimizing the usage of methane and planning the consumption of methane in the Mezzogiorno.

There are also those statements attributed to IASM regarding the possibilities of methane usage, with initial research having already been done on the consumption by civil and industrial areas. Presently it would only be possible to supply 34 municipalities with natural gas. This could be accomplished by the

construction of so called "suspender," linking the urban central distribution point, as is the case involving water.

Those not linked via network will only be able to make use of the "suspender" near the city, assuming it will be brought as close as that. There are present, however, all those conditions that may turn the case of Algerian methane into a missed opportunity. More than a year ago, communist Senator Flavio Bertone said: "We've missed the boat. Even if work on the distribution network in the cities were to begin tomorrow, they would not be ready before 1984, whereas Algerian gas will begin to arrive by the end of 1981." And the work has not yet begun.

"For a city with 20,000 inhabitants" stated Armando Mirabile, "at least 4 years are needed, as well as much money." According to an estimate made in 1979, in order to bring methane to the cities of the Mezzogiorno, 700 billion lire were needed, or 1,000 billion lire at present day prices.

Money, however, is not all. What are needed are ideas, projects. On this front also the delays appear unsurmountable. The municipalities and the region have been very slow in responding, with the result that, as Lorenzo Roasio, president of SNAM (1979) foresaw, "At least for the first few years, a large percentage of this methane will be used up by ENEL [National Electric Power Agency]." According to the deputy director of the Ministry for Industry, Mario Allegra, this is a luxury "and at the same time a waste, even when compared to municipal norms."

"There are still problems of a marginal nature for completely integrating the existing methane pipeline in Sicily, but I am optimistic because I do not foresee any impediments to the concept that Algerian methane, for Sicily, is a product to be exploited to the fullest extent" stated Alberto Grandi in Palermo, ignoring (not being able to do otherwise) the enormous problems of usage costs and lead times in relation to the network for civil use.

The secretary general of the Sicilian branch of CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions], Sergio D'Antoni, on this point, appears to have his mind made up: "The number of municipalities that can be serviced, 34 in all, is too small. Instead, the number should be 87, as IASM stated. Then there is the matter involving price. We were told that we would have to pay more than in the North, because of the network linking expenditures. This is absurd. To begin with, a uniform fee for everyone is unjust, because one could not offer a reduced methane price as the only real serious incentive to attract new industry. Furthermore, ENI should not stop just with the planning aspect of the network. It must study the methane gas usage and make up for the region's delays, because it is equipped to do so. The government can legitimately ask ENI for a different kind of collaboration in view of the fact that it managed to obtain just what it wanted when it came to hydrocarbons research."

There are those who try to make preparations, as for example a consortium of 29 municipalities in the Palermo area, which will have 300,000 outlets to serve 1.5 million people. But these are rare exceptions. One runs the risk that by 1984, when methane reaches the terminal of Minerbio, thanks to a previous request, the methane may go right up the peninsula, straight to Northern Europe, making use of the very pipelines with which we presently receive gas.



The stakes are extremely high, and the opportunity to verify ENI-Region's extent of its gentleman's agreement (the letter of intent does not allow any hypotheses) lies in the actual pipeline itself.

It would be unforgivable to have been able to achieve such a high technological level in the network's construction and to have been able to demonstrate such sagacity in the accord with the North African countries and then letting it all go to waste because of ignorance and lack of depth. It took 18 years of hard work to set the pipeline up. And that is not all.

On 28 October 1962, a few hours before the Bescape incident, Mattei was supposed to meet, in Milan, with Ben Bella, leader of the Algerian revolution. On 6 November of the same year the accord for the methane pipeline should have begun to take shape. It was Eugenio Cefis, however, who was the ENI representative in Paris at a meeting that terminated the whole negotiations. This happened because Mattei's successor had, in the meantime, reached an accord with American oil companies, agreeing to set up a company for the transport of methane by ship from Libya.

Eight years later, EMS and ENI fought a harsh battle over the pipeline. Graziano Verzotto and Vito Guarrasi took part in the fray.

Eighteen years of suspicions, intrigues, clamorous incidents, all make up a disquieting page of Sicilian history, much of which still has to be written.

9209

C50: 3104

## METHANE PIPELINE NETWORK IN APULIA DESCRIBED

Bari LA GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO in Italian 5 Feb 81 p 4

[Article by Franco Ferorelli: "Apulia To Benefit Greatly from Algerian Flow of Methane"]

[Text] Soon, thanks to the new Algerian methane pipeline, a river of several billion cubic meters of methane per year will flow across Apulia.

Right off, we will collect about one-third of it to be used for both civil and industrial purposes, with enormous benefits for the economic development of our region. The other day the regional council approved a plan for the first phase of methane conversion, namely to complete the necessary work to avoid losing this resource and having it end up being used only by northern regions.

The coming of Algerian methane is of interest not only to technicians: the whole citizenry will be involved and will be able to profit from this truly historical occasion for the Mezzogiorno.

With regard to civil uses, methane can be used for cooking, heating and for making hot water. A total of 202 million cubic meters per year should be earmarked for Apulia for these uses. Each family will be able to save about 30,000 lire yearly for lighting expenses. Actually, the average yearly expense for electricity needed for the domestic production of hot water is about 90,000 lire, while if using methane, it would be only 62,000.

Significant savings could be achieved by using methane to heat buildings. To be sure, condominiums will have to face the expense of equipment changeover, but it appears that this expense can be payed off in less than 2 years. After that, the savings should be considerable.

About 2 billion cubic meters are to be set aside for industrial use, reducing the consumption of naptha and petroleum. Those companies which can make fullest use of methane include those that need to manufacture steam, especially those companies engaged in ceramics, tobacco plants, textile plants and those concerns active in the agricultural food products sector.

This involves, therefore, industrial plants that happen to be well represented in our region.

For the completion of the regionally approved plan, a total of 217 billion lire for new pipelines and 83 billion lire for the modification, restructure and extension of existing pipelines has been set aside. These programs will require about 3.5 million work days, giving local employment a shot in the arm.

Once completed, the network will provide about 1,000 jobs, and 1,000 fewer on the unemployment line is not a number to underestimate.

This famous methane pipeline from Algeria has been much talked about, but people do not even know its outline. This might be a proper place to describe, in general terms, this great undertaking and its ramifications in Apulia.

The methane pipeline "lands" in Sicily, At Mazara del Vallo, passes by Agrigento, Enna, Messina, crosses the Strait, climbs up the peninsula, passes between Avellino and Benevento at its halfway point, reaches Frosinone and then continues on North. This makes up the main trunk line.

Two links, near Benevento and along the Ionian Arch near Castrovillari connect the network to the Apulian distribution network, part of which is already in place. The Apulian system involves a principal trunk which runs along the border with Basilicata (Candela-Taranto Canal). Two transversal "suspenders" branch out from this principal trunk: Ferrandina-Bari and Martina-Monopoli. Another transversal suspender, in the province of Foggia, links Candela to Manfredonia and Barletta.

The above include already existing tracts. The methane network launched by the region calls for the completion of a main connector, along the Taranto-Brindisi-Lecce line, with links to Maglie and Nardo and a new connector along the Bitonto, Bisceglie, Corato Trani and Barletta line. Two additional secondary connectors are planned, one to San Severo-Apricena, and another serving the municipalities of Martina, Alberobello, Locorotondo, Cisternino, Noci, etc.

There will be a total of 69 municipalities in Apulia involved in the distribution of Algerian Methane during this phase. They are divided into categories according to present network status:

Municipalities whose networks are already connected but need enlargement (14): Bari, Andria, Bitonto, Castellanan, Conversano, Giovinazzo, Mola, Monopoli, Polignano, Triggiano, Valenzano, Deliceto, Lucera, Massafra.

Municipalities with already connected networks needing revision (presently using a methane mixture) (2): Foggia and Taranto.

Municipality with existing network still to be connected (presently not using methane) (1): Lecce.

Municipalities needing new city networks (39): Ascoli Satriano, Altamura, Barletta, Biccari, Bisceglie, Bitetto, Bovino, Brindisi, Candela, Canosa, Cerignola, Corato, Castellana, Fasano, Francavilla, Gioia, Gravina, Grottaglie, Latiano, Manfredonia, Margherita di Savoia, Martina Franca, Mesagne, Modugno, Molfetta, Noci, Noicattaro, Palo, Putignano, Rutigliano, Ruvo, San Fernando, San Pietro, San Severo, Spinazzola, Squinzano, Terlizzi, Trani, Trinitapoli.

Municipalities to use methane which have been added to the original SNAM [National Gas Pipeline Company] plan by the region (13) Alberobello, Apricena, Bitritto, Capurso, Carapelle, Cisternino, Galatina, Grumo Appula, Locorotondo, Ortanova, Palagiano, Torremaggiore and Trepuzzi.



## NEW INCOME TAX RATES APPROVED

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 20 Mar 81 p 1

[Text]

**T**HE COUNCIL of Ministers yesterday endorsed the new income tax rate charges and reliefs agreed on Thursday at a meeting of the Minister of Finance with representatives of the business world and the unions.

The Council at its regular weekly session yesterday approved the proposals and authorised the Minister of Finance to submit the relevant Bill to the House of Representatives for ratification.

The Bill also provides for incentives to encourage investments and savings and for diversification of local production as well as export boosting.

It is recalled that both

the business and labour representatives agreed with the Finance Minister's suggestion that in the presentation and handling of labour demands, due regard will be had to the tax reliefs that the new tax revision will have.

The Council of Ministers yesterday also approved legislation concerning rent restriction and housing and amendment legislations about town planning.

#### Trade unions

Furthermore the Council approved the issue of regulations about seniority and promotions of officers and NCO's of the Republic's security forces.

The new income tax rates were also approved yesterday at a meeting of trade unions representatives, including public servants and teachers unions.

Under the new arrangements incomes of up to £1,000 are exempt from any tax. From £1,000 to £1,500 the tax is 100 mls going up to 550 mls for incomes of from £8,000 to £10,000 and 600 mls for incomes of over £10,000.

The tax relief for a wife is £250 and for children below 16 £250 while for children in senior schools in Cyprus the allowance is £300 and for children studying abroad £1,000.

The unions said that it was agreed that the government shall consider a new revision about the rates in two years time, effective January 1983.

## BRIEFS

REFUGEE HOUSING--The Special Relief Fund budget for the current year provides for a total expenditure of £25 million for refugee housing, the Deputy Minister of the Interior Mr P. Stylianou said. The Deputy Minister who was visiting refugee establishments in the Nicosia district said the budget will be submitted by the end of the current month to the Council of Ministers for their approval. Mr Stylianou said that £13 million is to be spent for government financed housing schemes, £1.6 million for self-housing schemes and infrastructure, £5.5 million for subsidies for self-housing schemes on government building sites and £4 million for subsidies and loans for self-housing schemes on self-owned building sites. Yesterday the Council of Ministers approved the payment of Easter bonus to needy displaced persons and needy people in the enclaved regions, to be paid out of the Special Relief Fund. [Text] [Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 20 Mar 81 p 1]

CSO: 4920

## PRESENT STATUS OF AGRICULTURE ANALYZED

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 4 Mar 81 pp 3-6, 8-10, 12

[Text] What Is the Present Status of Greek Agriculture?

ON one side it can be seen that a satisfactory level of production has been reached. A great variety of foods and raw materials are produced in good quantities so as to ensure sufficient supply of the domestic market in some products, and considerable exports. On the other hand, a study of the statistics shows that now, and for several years, the volume of Greek agricultural production has been increasing very slowly. The fact that the increase in the GNP in 1980 amounted to only 1% (compared to 3.9% in 1979) and that this increase can be attributed exclusively to agriculture, cannot disguise the fact that the gross production of the agricultural sector has remained almost stagnant during the last decade.

In the years from 1976 to 1980, the gross agricultural production increased by only 1.7%. The agricultural sector seems to have lost its vigour. The agricultural family is under-employed, and over the last three years the farmers' low income has not improved, and the gap between agricultural and non-agricultural incomes has widened even further. (In Greece, the agricultural income is one third that of the non-agricultural income, while in the EC it is half.)

The combination of small and fragmented holdings, the scarcity of irrigated land, low investments, and a large rural population, relatively poor soil quality, a low degree of mechanisation, the deficiencies of the marketing methods of agricultural products, and the lack of a consistent agricultural policy in Greece, have not helped to make farming a profitable activity in Greece. In addition, producers have become accustomed to the idea that the State would somehow provide them with a certain level of income and stability, and so did not change the existing farm structure, and limited their efforts to increase productivity by demanding additional subsidies, and other forms of assistance.

Often, measures taken to promote a more rapid rate of change in the sector were offset or compromised by policies elsewhere in the national economy, and the inevitable result that the Greek farmer has not been encouraged to become an entrepreneur, even when he has become a landowner. The introduction of technology to the production stage of agricultural activity has resulted in an excessive supply of agricultural produce, and a huge problem concerning the absorption. The need to coordinate production with processing and marketing has become increasingly apparent.

It is increasingly felt that, to concentrate only on the supply, without considering the demand, is dangerous. There are many weaknesses and deficiencies in the marketing of agricultural products — the lack of an adequate number of large export-oriented units, with a high and steady turnover, the relatively small participation of cooperative units in the distribution of agricultural produce, and the existence of a great number of commercial intermediaries which significantly increase the final sale price at the expense of both the producer and the consumer, the lack of standardisation of all products sold locally, while the products destined for export are standardised at the level of the trader, and not the producer, the existence of a fixed upper-limit price mechanism, which discouraged producers from engaging in certain productive activities, the insufficient information on the conditions of the market both at home and abroad, aggravated by inadequate training on sales promotion, etc.

Greece has entered the EC, with all these problems with it. The battle that is to be fought in the agricultural sector is one of the most serious. First, because as has already been mentioned, the Greek agricultural sector has only a low degree of development. The increasing productivity in the agricultural sector is a basic prerequisite for increased productivity in the whole economy. Secondly, one of Greece's main aims must be to exert an influence on the CAP, so as to lead in the changes which will be of benefit for Mediterranean agriculture. To obtain this, there will have to be more training and education, greater specialisation, more rational organisation of activities, more public services, greater participation of the rural population in the cultural life of the country, and an effort to narrow the gap between the rural society and the urban centres.

## State Policy and Problems

THOSE who are in favour of Greece's accession to the EC claim that CAP will bring about the restructuring of agriculture in Greece, and will lead to the more profitable employment of a lot of farm workers. However, those who are opposed to the accession insist that it will lead to the ruin of Greek agriculture, and the depopulation of the Greek countryside. Both arguments seem to be more of a political nature than one that reflects the approaching situation.

CAP is not a political boss, with the power to promise, save or condemn. Nor is CAP a replacement for the State. The question is whether or not the structure of Greek agriculture is such that it will be able successfully to exploit the benefits offered by CAP and keep pace with the other member-countries within the framework of a successful Common Agricultural Policy. Another question is whether the organisation of our agricultural businesses will enable us to hold a strong position against CAP, and ever offer alternatives to politics which are not advantageous for Greece, as other member-states have done.

In other words, will the State undertake the appropriate policy for the re-animation of the whole agricultural sector, and this means true assistance for the farmer, or will he rely on the "Uncle from America"? It is a fact that in the past, even when emphasis was given to agriculture, this was more often verbal, rather than actual, or at least unsubstantial.

— Apart from the higher rate of inflation (25% in 1980), Greek farmers have been badly hit by the energy crisis in recent years. This is because production costs are affected both directly and indirectly by the increasing oil prices, as fertilisers, pesticides, etc., are produced with oil as their basic raw material. In relation to those increases, it is worth noting that in Italy and Germany, fuel for agricultural use is subsidised at a rate of 30-50%. It is easy to understand how these countries have secured their competitiveness in the Common Market.

For about two years, the financing programme of the Agricultural Bank has remained stagnant, something which has created huge problems for the farmers. The increased rate of interest for agriculture has in a way likened it to a speculative enterprise. The Agricultural

Bank finances only 10% of all agricultural machinery. The other 90% is provided by private sources, with an advance payment of 25%, and a three-year credit with a very high interest rate of around 30%. In Italy, the farmer buys agricultural machinery with an interest rate of 5%, in Germany 10-11%, in France 11.5%, and in Holland 12.5%.

— Only 8% of total investments are allocated to agriculture. Furthermore, the agricultural surplus (or savings) has been continually used to finance industrialisation, at the expense of the development of agriculture, which is left to stagnate, with the result that the average agricultural income is only one third of the average urban income, while in the EC it is half. It is surprising to see that at constant prices, the public investments over the last five years have been at the level of the period from 1960-63. The investments of 1981, at constant prices, will be even lower than those of 1980, even if the CAP subsidies for investments are included in the 1981 budget.

The lack of programming has often led to difficult conditions for farmers.

- o Corn farmers suffered losses as a result of inadequate installations of drying and storage facilities.

- o Although the wheat harvest in 1980 reached 2,800 thousand tons, there were storage problems. As a result, at the last minute, the Ministry of Agriculture asked the Ministry of Commerce to invite international export tenders for 250,000 tons of soft wheat, and 100,000 tons of hard wheat.

- o The considerable delay by the government in settling prices and determining the level of subsidies caused large quantities of Greek tomato paste to remain unsold.

- o It is now almost the rule for the government to announce its intentions after sowing has taken place, and to make decisions just at harvest time.

- o The lack of recent statistics for the agricultural sector proves the inadequate organisation and programming. The number and the size of the farms in Greece and the percentage of the workforce employed on the land are not only undetermined, but are also the subject of dispute.

There is a vital need for the systematic improvement of the living conditions in the countryside, so that young people, attracted by the increase in the agricultural income, will choose to be employed in agriculture.

- o With the small sized plots of land that prevail in Greece, the farmer and his family are unable to work on their farm throughout the year.

- o There are few opportunities for non-agricultural work, such as the industrial processing of agricultural products, road construction, etc. So the agricultural family is under-employed and has only a low income.

- o The agricultural pensions are not up to the level required by modern society, and thus are not an incentive for young people.

## Agriculture in the EC and Greece

THE agricultural land in the nine EC countries (excluding Greece) totals 940 million stremma – that is, 61.4% of the total land area of the member-states. Of the agricultural land, 55.3% is used for arable farming, (about 520 million stremmata) and 44.7 is grazing land (about 420 million stremmata).

Cultivated land in Greece covers only about 30% of the total land area, as Greece is a mountainous country. 45% of the total arable land is situated in mountainous or semi-mountainous regions. 80% of total pastureland is to be found in such regions. Pasture land

amounts to 39.9% of the total area.

According to the National Statistics Service, in 1978 the total cultivated area amounted to 34,434,000 stremmata. Ploughed land covered an area of 24,427,000 stremmata.

In the EC, about 9.5 million people are employed in agriculture. The total number of employed is 101 million. The country with the greatest percentage of the working population employed in agriculture is Ireland with 24.3% followed by Italy (16.6%) and France (12%). England, with 2.8%, has the smallest percentage.

## EC and Greece--Agriculture and the economy

The structure of the Greek economy is different from the Community's, mainly because of the extent of the contributions of the agricultural and industrial sectors. The EC industrial sector is very much developed, and produces 44.4% of the total GNP (30% in Greece). In Greece, the agricultural sector produces 14.3% (1977) of the total produce, while in the EC this figure is only 5.3% (1977). These differences are even more marked in employment. In the EC the industrial sector employs 41% of the total labour force, while in Greece this is only 29%. The agricultural sector in the EC employs 8.4%, and in Greece 28%.

Food and beverages make up 30% of Greece's exports, and 10% of the EC exports. In trade within the Community, member-countries of the EC import

48.3% of the total from non-member countries, and 51.7% of their exports are directed to other member-countries. Greece exports over 50% of its total exports to EC countries, and this percentage is expected to increase further.

There are also considerable differences between Greece and the EC in the structure of agriculture. The structure of agricultural production differs basically in relation to the importance of animal and farm production. In the EC, animal production constitutes 59% of the total agricultural production, while in Greece this is only 32%. The corresponding percentages for vegetable production are 41% for the EC and 68% in Greece. There are further differences in the methods of farm production. Of the total area of agri-



cultural land in the EC, 90% is given to yearly production, while in Greece this is only 73%. The other 10% and 27% are for perennial crops, that is vines, and olive trees.

In the EC (except for Italy and France), farm production concentrates mainly on cereals, potatoes, and sugar-beet. However, vegetable production in Greece presents a great variety and includes the traditional Mediterranean produce (oil, olives, tobacco, corn, cotton, tomatoes, grapes, wine, hard wheat, raisins, citrus fruit, peaches and apricots) as well as the produce of the more northern countries (soft wheat, barley, potatoes, sugar beet). This diversity of vegetable production, and the low animal production makes Greek

agriculture complimentary rather than competitive with agriculture in the EC. There will be competition between Greece, Italy and France for some of the Mediterranean produce, and it is mainly for this reason and these products that there is a seven-year transition period (for tomatoes and peaches, either fresh or processed).

The EC is self-sufficient in the basic products as the following table shows.

Cereals	95%
Potatoes	101%
Sugar	87%
Dairy products	100%
Wine	95%
Eggs	100%
Meat	96%

## Land Fragmentation

IT is a fact that in Greece, generally speaking, the farms are fragmented and of a small size, and the climate is unstable. But these factors, which naturally have a negative effect on the efforts of the producers, do not condemn Greek agriculture to remain at the current levels of productivity. The further exploitation of positive factors is necessary, such as investment, mechanisation, land consolidation, and the practical and sophisticated orientation of Greek agriculture.

At the moment the Greek farmers are facing the following structural and institutional obstacles:

- 1) small scale production, with relatively high costs, and low productivity
- 2) a lack of horizontal and vertical integration
- 3) regional disparities which are due primarily to the differences in the micro-climatic and soil conditions
- 4) short profit margins for the producers, primarily due to the present inefficient marketing system.

The small size of the holdings is one of the main structural problems of Greek agriculture, as well as the high degree of fragmentation. The average size of an agricultural holding is around 37 stremmata, compared to an EC average of 150 stremmata. According to the official census in 1971, only 800

thousand holdings were found to be larger than 18 stremmata; and even these were divided further into 7 or 8 plots often scattered over a great distance.

Regionally, differences can be noted in the average size of the holding. More specifically, Thrace (4.42 ha), Thessaly (4.27 ha) represent relatively large sizes, while Epirus (2.03 ha) and the Ionian Islands (2.17 ha) have relatively small farms. The number of fragments per holding was 6.5 with an average size of 0.54 ha in 1971, compared to 7.1 and 0.47 in 1961. Crete, with 10.3 fragments of an average size of 0.27 has a high degree of fragmentation, while Thessaly (5.6 and 0.82) has a relatively low degree.

The problem of the small size of farms becomes even more acute when fragmentation is taken into consideration. The causes of fragmentation in Greece can be summarized as follows:

- a) the governmental land distribution schemes
- b) the inheritance law
- c) the tradition of providing a dowry
- d) the lack of non-agricultural opportunities which reinforces a high propensity to invest in land, with the inadequacy of liquid assets, has led to transactions in small pieces of land.

The most serious consequences of fragmentation are a) the restriction of the scale of construction of land improve-

ment and irrigation works b) inefficient use of the land, or a lack of cultivation c) the need to have a large number of access routes, and the unnecessary creation of boundaries, leading to land waste, d) difficulty in the application of modern technology, due to the small size and slope of fragments, e) hinderance in the application of intensive forms of cultivation and supervision. Generally, it can be concluded that fragmentation has been a drawback to mechanisation and economic farming.

In Greece, land consolidation has been used as a primary measure to correct fragmentation. Consolidation has taken place on both a voluntary and compulsory basis. During the period 1960-1969, the consolidated land amounted to about 500.09 thousand ha., that is, 13.1% of the total cultivated area. In 1978, the consolidated land was 641.79 thousand ha. The consolidation of scattered holdings is expected to continue with increasing momentum, with joint venture farming, if only because the bulk of the funding from CAP will go to the more efficient units.

Considering the small size of the average holding, and the fragmentation of properties, it is clear that only a strong and commercially-oriented cooperative movement can offer a realistic solution to these problems. Distribution and sales have to be brought into the proper domain of agricultural cooperation, if the modernisation of agriculture and its expansion and development are to be expected.

### Land fallowness

In Greece, the land lies fallow for only a short time, and is either intensively fertilised or not fertilised at all. This naturally implies low land productivity. It is estimated that on average in Greece, land lies fallow for only 5 months, compared to 2 years in the EC countries. According to the 1971 census, the agricultural output per farm in Greece, was only about 40% of the EC average.

Intensifying mechanisation certainly improves productivity, but land productivity also depends heavily on the length of time that the land lies fallow. Mechanisation and land fallowness are therefore two major contributions to land productivity, and give good results when

applied simultaneously. Otherwise, the benefits likely to be obtained from the one can be offset by the costs incurred by the absence of the other.

### Irrigation

The area of land under irrigation in Greece has increased significantly since 1926 when the first attempts at land reclamation were undertaken by the State. The average annual rate of increase has been 25,000 ha. of irrigated land – or 27,000 ha during 1956-66 and 29,000 ha during 1966-76. The total irrigated area is estimated at about 25% of the total cultivated area in Greece (900,000 ha). Government collective irrigation projects account for 28% while private irrigation projects take up the rest of the cultivated and irrigated area.

66% of the water used for irrigation comes from the surface, and 34% from underground sources. Nearly all surface water (90%) originates in rivers and summer runoffs, and only 10% from natural or artificial lakes. Of the total irrigation water, 37% is from natural inflow, and 63% from pumping. Of the total irrigated area, about 800,000 hectares (or 60%) is irrigated by surface flow irrigation, using borders, furrows, and flooding. Over the rest of the area, sprinklers or localised methods are applied.

The most important crops farmed in public irrigation projects are the following:

Tilled crops	52%
Alfalfa	17%
Fruit trees	14%
Vegetables	10%
Olive trees	4%
Vineyards	2%
Miscellaneous	1%

A report prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Hellenic Committee of Irrigation and Drainage states that irrigated land in Greece can be increased to a total of 1,600,000 ha thus averaging 42% of the whole cultivated area of land.

In view of the expected significant increase of irrigated areas in the future, and of the concomittant reduction of the active agricultural population, the problem of the proper and economic use of irrigation water and of human labour will become acute. Although the progress



that took place during the last 15 years in irrigation techniques is important, it does not cover all the needs. A possible substantial improvement in irrigation methods might be reached by the 'new methods' (i.e. drip irrigation).

These methods have already been sufficiently spread over among farmers, and there is a general tendency for their further expansion. The main reason for the interest in these methods are conservation of water, the possibility of using low water discharges and automation of irrigation to a great extent, resulting in a reduction of labour costs. Sprayers are more popular than drippers today in Greece. Those used give between 30 and 80 litres an hour, have a range of between 1.20 and 2.00 metres, and turn through 180°. In drip irrigation, drippers usually give between 4 and 7 litres an hour of water, and normally they can easily be replaced if blocked. Blocking of the drippers by salts and small organisms are often the cause for the replacement of the initial dripper installation with sprayers. Blocking of the drippers in Greece, is quite common, especially in certain areas like the Peloponnese where the water has a high salt content.

Recently, the trend for expansion in localised irrigation has also been observed in areas with no serious water resource problems. The reasons for this are the economic advantages, the increase in yields, and a reduced level of plant diseases. Even for those crops which have never been irrigated in Greece, the cultivation of almond trees for example, localised irrigation is now used. The climatic conditions, and the sort of agricultural production in Greece generally promise a very rapid expansion of modern irrigation and consequently of the equipment market in the near future.

#### MECHANISATION

GREECE's accession to the EC requires that agriculture adjust to the new conditions, and turn to more productive cultivations, on a basis of improved organisation. The application of advanced technological methods, and the use of modern equipment will prove vital if Greek agriculture is to survive (and has to). In recent years, government policy has been clear on introducing and supporting the mechanisation of

agriculture for the intensification of agricultural production. What is not clear however, is the actual combination of policies or strategies needed to influence the development of agriculture in the right direction. This is not easy, particularly in the light of the interdependence of the development of both sectors of the economy - agricultural and non-agricultural.

In 1980, the number of pieces of agricultural machinery which were sold in Greece was 20% lower than the year before. This of course is due to the low agricultural income, but also the methods of subsidising that are applied in Greece. The Agricultural Bank, the principal institution effecting government agricultural policy, subsidised only 10% of the machinery. The farmers bought the other 90% with credit from private agencies with a prepayment of 25% of the value, and three-year credit with an interest rate of 30%.

Considering only the advance payment is estimated, farmers paid over one billion drachmas for the purchase of machinery in 1980. In the EC countries, the farmer buys the machinery at an interest rate of 5% in Italy, 10.11% in Germany, 11.5% in France, 12.5% in Holland, and through subsidies of their cooperative banks.

In order to gain a realistic view of the mechanisation of Greek agriculture, it has to be emphasised within the general framework of agricultural problems in Greece, such as:

i) fragmentation - a severe hinderance to mechanisation and economic farming  
ii) the high rural population means that to a large extent cultivation has yet to be mechanised.

iii) land fallowness - Intensifying mechanisation certainly improves productivity, but the fertility and productivity of the land also depend heavily on the length of time it has been allowed to lie fallow. Mechanisation and land fallowness are therefore two major contributions to land productivity, and give good results when they are applied simultaneously.

iv) the agricultural surplus, or savings, have been conventionally used to finance industrialisation at the expense of agriculture itself. It is interesting to note that the average agricultural income is only one third of the urban income, while in the EC countries, it is half. The

purchase of agricultural machinery and equipment has therefore become a problem. This situation has led to the mechanisation of cultivation in Greece to be heavily dependent on government incentives.

The intensity of agricultural mechanisation in Greece has considerably increased in the 20 year period from 1955-1975, that is, since the need for labour substitution first appeared. In 1978, there were 12.6 ha of arable land per tractor, compared to 16.0 in 1975. The degree of mechanisation is considered relatively low when compared to the EC average, which is around 10 ha.

Even though the degree of mechanisation has considerably increased, the return of capital has not been proportional to the level of capital stock, and this may be due to a) the under-utilisation of machinery b) the relatively small size of fragment per holding, and c) the irrational purchase and use of machinery and the fairly low knowledge of producers.

The tractor is the first and most basic implement that the farmer buys. Low power (less than 18hp) tractors in Greece still occupy a significant part of the market, accounting for approximately 40% of all tractors used. This rises to 60% in mountainous areas, and falls to 30% in the lowlands. Small machinery is better suited to the needs of the Greek farmer, as small and scattered plots of land are not suitable for large investments in machinery even if the machine itself would increase efficiency and productivity.

The most powerful range of tractors, the farm wheeled vehicles, are increasing their share of the market however, partly due to their versatility when used in conjunction with other implements. Tractor-driven implements, however, according to trade circles, are not so popular, and in some cases are not even particularly well-known among the majority of farmers, except, of course, for the basic and conventional implements - ploughs, disc-harrows, rotavators, etc. One of the reasons for this has been the protection offered to the domestic firms which allows them to confine their output to conventional machinery, using mainly rather older technology, except for some notable exceptions in the larger firms.

Combine harvesters, on the other hand, are rapidly replacing simple harvesters, and threshers, and so the demand for this type of machinery, now considered indispensable, is rapidly expanding. Mechanisation and group farming of cotton, applied and promoted by the Hellenic Cotton Board, ensure a high demand for cotton pickers (estimated at 120 to 150 pieces annually), cotton planters, and other related modern technological equipment.

Another expanding sector is irrigation, and sales of complete irrigation systems. The demand for agricultural equipment in general, depends on market forces, and in particular the income of the farmers, which vary widely, according to the weather and the harvest each year.

Loans from the Agricultural Bank are granted only under certain conditions and terms, the main factors being the origin of the type of the machinery to be purchased, on the principle of protection of the domestic industry. In this way, the Bank directs demand towards certain types of machinery, even if this does not involve the best technology, and does not best suit the farmer's needs.

The machinery used in agricultural production are both imported and produced locally. Domestic production is mainly of various types of ploughs, tills, rotavators, drills, and two-wheel tractors. Most of the modern and sophisticated agricultural equipment used by the Greek farmers is imported (principal suppliers are the EC and COMECON countries). Imports of agricultural machinery have fluctuated in recent years. In 1977 they amounted to 1,225 million drachmas, but they dropped by 77% in 1978, to 773 million drachmas, then rose again in 1979 to 1,686 million drachmas (an increase of 118%). It is expected that the gradual abolition of import duties will exert two different forces on the Greek industry for agricultural machinery.

First, the firms producing agricultural machinery will face stronger price-competition from cheaper imported machinery. Secondly, the raw materials used in the production of the machinery will be less expensive, thus lowering costs, or at least keeping them level for some time.

The current volume of imports and the needs of further mechanisation reveal the likelihood of the entry and

establishment of foreign firms in Greece. The present structure of the industry does not seem to create any barrier to possible entrants. There are about 15 firms with over 10 employees. Four of these firms have total assets of 90.5% and one of these has total assets covering 65.8% of the total. The level of imports shows however, the potential of the market to absorb more of the domestically produced output. This offsets any barriers to the entry of new firms, which are likely to be foreign. Furthermore, a country strongly interested in keeping its balance of payments at satisfactory levels, favours imports of foreign capital, which is not always an investment that benefits the domestic producers.

The expansion of domestic production is expected to be the primary target of the Greek industry for agricultural machinery. This will not be achieved through the creation of new small or medium-sized units, which would be vulnerable to strong EC competition. The existing units have to expand and grow in size, with a simul-

taneous effort towards diversification and advancement of technology, so that fewer imports will be required to meet domestic demands.

Finally, emphasis must be given to the fact that when a farmer arranges credit for the purchase of a tractor, he should be left free to choose the type that will best suit his needs. The Agricultural Bank should also concentrate on the financing of the purchasing of drills, tillers, rotavators, etc., which are the accessories of the tractor, rather than the purchase of tractors themselves. This is mainly because in this way, specialised cultivation, which requires specialised equipment, will be promoted. Greece has a smaller proportion of accessories per tractor than any other EC country.

The future of the agricultural sector largely depends on the progress made in the mechanisation of agricultural methods. It is this that will help the farmer to make more efficient use of all the resources of his farm, and thus help to improve its output.

## BILL ON FUND FOR SOUTH CRITICIZED

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 1 Feb 81 p 93

[Article by A.S.]

[Text] On 5 December 1980 the cabinet very quietly approved a bill containing new standards for intervention in the Mezzogiorno and new ground-rules for restructuring the Fund itself. With 2 months gone by, no trace of the bill can be found. Parliament has waited in vain for it to reach the floor, and the Chamber's budget committee, unable to act, has had to postpone debate on the decree extending the life of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno.

Just where the phantom bill has wound up nobody knows for sure, but its fugitive status, paradoxically enough, is grounds for hope: it lets us hope that, thanks to an unexpected rush of brains to the head of some cabinet minister, it has been sent to the shredder. Actually, the bill initially drafted in six titles and 53 articles contains such flaws, and so many of them, as to place it beyond help. The thinking it reflects is, as always, that of a bill drafted primarily on the basis of special-interest criteria.

Just one example: article 21, which lays down the rules for granting financial subsidies to companies desirous of investing in the Mezzogiorno. The machinery devised for this procedure by the government boils down to this: the company goes to a medium-term credit institution, which then conducts an investigation and decides whether or not to grant a loan at prevailing interest rates. If the investigation proves favorable, the company then goes to the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (it is not yet clear whether the Cassa will remain one body or be split into two agencies), and applies for reimbursement of 70 percent of the interest it must pay on 40 percent of the approved investment and, on top of that, applies for a 30-percent grant from the sinking fund. This is the procedure for applicants considering an investment of less than 30 billion lire; any planned investment in excess of 30 billion lire brings the Interministerial Committee for Industrial Policy Coordination (CIPI) into the act. Note, though, that para 4 of article 21 expressly stipulates that the Cassa shall rule on the company's request

for a grant "solely on the basis of the elements embodied in the loan contract entered into with the lending institution." No doubt about what that means: the company need only bring the usual pressures to bear, get a loan from the credit institution, and the Cassa must grant the incentive, an incentive for which it has substantially no responsibility.

The aberrant implications in this and other rules are equally obvious: the applicant company is relieved of all risk, the bank is saddled with an activity which is properly an entrepreneurial task, and liabilities under criminal statutes are thoroughly scrambled.

All these aspects were underscored with a wealth of technical and juridical commentary by Judge Enrico Di Nicola in the seminar sponsored last week in Angers by the Institute for International Relations. And the governor of the Bank of Italy, Carlo Ciampi, who attended the meeting, hastened to voice his concerns over the drift of the banking institutions away from their proper purposes, seconding the injunctions stated by an authoritative judge upon the juridical and criminal aspects of such regulations.

We need not delude ourselves with the notion that the cabinet's sensitivities are on a par with that of the Bank of Italy, particularly if Southern Development Minister Nicola Capria and his colleagues have determined to float still another patronage bill.

6182

CSO: 3104



## UNIONS CONFER WITH GOVERNMENT OF SICILY ON LEGISLATION

Palermo GIORNALE DI SICILIA in Italian 27 Jan 81 p 12

[Article by Salvatore Parlagreco]

[Text] Maybe this is the right way to save the legislature: the CGIL-CISL-UIL United Federation of Labor, in a letter addressed to the democratic parties represented in the Sicilian Regional Assembly (ARS), set forth the need for broad consensus behind approval of a batch of bills whose passage is deemed urgently necessary. Having wound up its series of meetings with the government, which yesterday continued its consideration of industry's problems at Palazzo d'Orleans, the labor organization will test the feasibility of its initiative on the parties.

Meanwhile, in yesterday's meeting between the government (Regional President D'Acquisto and Councilman Grillo) and the United Federation (Franchi, Ancona, Colombo, Miata, and Bartoli), there was some agreement and several important decisions were reached.

The law that grants special aid to Sicilian industry will undergo some alterations. The proliferation -- "pulverization" -- of aid sources will be obviated, as the unions ask, and investments will be concentrated in troubled sectors. The law on urbanization of industrial areas will be "incorporated" into that on recession countermeasures. If the agreement works, ARS would have to debate and approve the bill before the end of this session of the legislature.

On 5 February, in Palermo, the National Gas Pipeline Company (SNAM), the Sicilian Methane Agency (EMS), and Siciliana Gas (the offspring of EMS and SNAM) will sit down together to work out the details of what must be done to bring natural gas to all of Sicily. This will be the first test for the agreement in principle reached between ENI and the region when Grandi and D'Acquisto met in Palermo.

On 6 February, there will be a meeting at the Industry Ministry in Rome on the problems of the pulp and paper industry, in which Sicily has an interest through SIACE. "The Region will be there," warned D'Acquisto.

The same commitment came from government on the thorny Montedison question (1,322 workers will be getting their pink slips from Priolo very shortly).

Back to the Palazzo D'Orleans meeting. There was also talk of electronics (very bad unemployment at Sgs-Ates in Palermo and Catania: "the heaviest inroad on jobs for women"), the automotive industry (get more than an assembly-line at FIAT's Termini plant and concentrate on the FIAT-Peugeot plant), railroad equipment (ESPI will have to look for understandings with private companies, but it will have to get them very soon or go it alone), textiles (depression in the Messina area), and construction (building schools and housing for cooperatives is not enough, partly because such housing already costs too much).

The chemical industry and the shipyards had already been discussed in an earlier meeting. A final meeting set for 30 January (scheduled date for an all-industry strike in Sicily) will perform an overall evaluation of the "availability" of the regional government.

The United Federation is not going to stop there, though. It wants to talk to SICINDUSTRIA, as well as to the politicians. This will be the first "official" meeting between industry and the unions in Sicily, but it is not surprising: both sides have come a lot closer to one another on industrial policy issues of late.

6182

CS0: 3104

## KUCUK BLASTS COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 13 Mar 81 p 1

[Text] National Unity Party General Secretary and Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Energy Irsen Kucuk has made a statement on the new slogans and views that have appeared in recent days.

Irsen Kucuk, who recalled that elections in southern and northern Cyprus are approaching, pointed out with regard to the communist AKEL party's efforts in southern Cyprus to seize power that there are parallel and persistent efforts by persons in the Turkish sector to spread the slogan, "Greek-Cypriot Communists in the South, Turkish-Cypriot Communists in the North."

Kucuk continued, "The Turkish-Cypriot community, which is waging a noble struggle, has walked in Ataturk's path through dedication to his revolution and principles. Only in this way has it carried its struggle to success. We are closely monitoring the present efforts of certain ideological deviants to spread among our people the slogan, 'Greek-Cypriot Communists in the South, Turkish-Cypriots in the North.'

"Moreover, we view with distress the fact that certain political figures on the eve of general elections are offering answers to the effect, 'If we came to power, we would solve the Cyprus problem in a short time.' In spite of the Federal Assembly decision supporting the establishment of a bi-regional, bi-communal federated Republic of Cyprus, it is clear that the Greek-Cypriots have constantly avoided this proposal and desire to establish unilateral sovereignty over the island. What is worrisome is the fact that ambitious politicians among us also harbor such queer attitudes. We will never give opportunity to those desiring to separate the Turkish-Cypriot people from their honorable cause and dash the cause for personal advantage. The National Unity Party, which opposes the smallest compromise of the national cause, will permit neither Communists nor Maoists and will always stand as patron and protector of the Turkish community's honorable cause through dedication to the principles of Ataturk.

CSO: 4907



## DURDURAN COMMENTS ON NUP EXPLOITATION

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 19 Mar 81 pp 1, 7

[Text] Communal Liberation Party [CLP] General Chairman Alpay Durduran, who held a press conference at party headquarters on the occasion of his party's fifth anniversary, said that it is very possible that the CLP will come to power alone following the elections. Durduran stated that there is even greater likelihood that the CLP could come to power in tandem with another party. He did not, however, disclose which party that might be.

The CLP General Chairman, who charged the government with trampling democracy and fundamental rights and squandering state resources, continued:

"Our Constitution has given every citizen 25 years of age the right to vote. The Constitution regards this as a 'Fundamental Right.' It empowers the state to remove all manner of restriction that might obstruct 'Fundamental Rights.' In this connection the president has been empowered to ensure respect for the Constitution. Despite the Industrial Holding and Cooperative Central Bank being affiliated by law with the executive branch, obstacles have arisen in the exercise of fundamental rights. Neither the government nor the president can duck responsibility for this. Using the prosecutor's office as a shield cannot save them.

"They know each of the opposition candidates. Moreover, it is being said that these candidates cannot return to the fold. However, they guarantee National Unity Party [NUP] candidates that they will return, not that they cannot. Apart from this, is there a principle left that the NUP has not sacrificed for its own interests?

By including civil servants in the General Billet Law, they are threatening retirement should a transfer not be accepted. They want to coerce their perceived opposition so as to ensure advancements for their own cronies by shifting 1960 empty billets as they see fit. Even were there a way to fight this coercion through the Supreme Court, elections would be over by the time of adjudication."

Durduran later drew attention to the baseless charges that have appeared concerning opposition parties selling out the homeland and the nation the nearer elections come. He stressed in this regard that the NUP is endeavoring to make itself "indispensable" by "exploiting everything."

Durduran answered a question on the likelihood of a coalition with the NUP by saying, "Our views on the NUP are well known. If there is a change in the NUP our party would discuss it (a coalition). At this juncture we do not hold out prospects for such a change." Durduran continued:

"Dear members of the press, democracy expects your help. All parties are open to a more visible examination by the press prior to elections. Democracy must be protected by exposing and criticizing practices that disrupt the power balance of society.

"We want to stress these matters in particular on this anniversary of the CLP. Such exploitation must cease in order that the parties can meet the needs of society in a sound manner."

CSO: 4907

## PARTY LEADERS DISCUSS ELECTIONS

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 14 Mar 81 p 1

[Text] The leaders of the seven parties which will contest the forthcoming parliamentary elections, tentatively scheduled for May 24, met at the House of Representatives to discuss how to keep the election campaign cool.

A statement from the office of the President of the House of Representatives, Mr Alecos Michaelides, who convened the meeting said that the party leaders expressed their views about the measures for a smooth and democratic election process.

The statement said that the views expressed will be studied and the party leaders will meet again on Monday week, March 23, to decide about their final attitude.

The forthcoming elections are the first to be held under the proportional representation system, under which the voters elect parties rather than individuals, though according to the law the voters can indicate on the voting card with a cross the names of their top preference.

## Participants

The participants at yesterday's meeting were House President and leader of the New Democratic Party (ADP) Mr Alecos Michaelides, Akel party leader Mr Papaioannou, Democratic Party parliamentary spokesman Mr G. Ladas, the Rally Party leader Mr Glafcos Clerides, the General Secretary of the Socialist Edek party Mr T. Hadjidemetriou, the leader of the reformist Pame party ex-Minister of Education Dr Sofianos and one of the leaders of the Union of the Centre Mr Christophides.

Though no date has yet been fixed for elections, press reports suggest that the two major parties in the House, Akel and the Democratic Party, have agreed to recommend May 24 and for this purpose the House will disband itself on April 16.

The voting will be for the elections of 35 members of the House.

Elections are also going to be held in the north both for 15 members of the Turkish Cypriot Legislative Assembly and for the office of "President" of the self-proclaimed Turkish Cypriot Federated State.

## BRIEFS

KLIRIDIS POLITICAL AIMS--Mr Glafcos Clerides, leader of the Rally party, last night emphatically denied that his party is "sheltering coupists." Mr Clerides appeared in the series of television interviews with party leaders, one each week, in the programme "Meet the Press" and answered questions put to him by representatives of the Cypriot press. Mr Clerides said that in essence there was no argument with Akel as to the aims of the national struggle but there was a difference about tactics. He said the difference between an Akel majority and a Rally majority would be that Akel rules out any initiatives from Western sources whereas the Rally accepts all initiatives conducive to a fair settlement, and would even accept a Moscow initiative. [Text] [Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 14 Mar 81 p 1]

CSO: 4920

## SURVEY ON EXTREME-RIGHTIST ATTITUDES, POTENTIAL

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 16 Mar 81 pp 51-60

[Unattributed article: "Hatred Toward Outsiders and Democracy"]

[Text] Commissioned by the office of the chancellor, the Munich Sinus Institute spent a year studying the rightist bent in the FRG. The conclusion was alarming to the clients in Bonn: 13 percent of the West German electorate have "an ideologically absolute, extreme-rightist world view"; half of these are in sympathy with violence and terrorism.

For months the chancellor's aides have been keeping a study under wraps. The results of research by opinion pollsters on the rightist bent among West Germans appear to them to be altogether too explosive. The planning department of the chancellor's office had commissioned the Munich Sinus Institute early in 1979 to explore the susceptibility of the FRG citizenry to right-wing radical slogans. Alarmed by the "Hitler craze" in the schools, the "punks" adorned with Nazi emblems, the increasing circulation of National-Socialist propaganda publications and increased acts of violence by extreme-rightist fanatics, those in Bonn wanted the following information:

What the extreme right's images of the world and the enemy look like and how it assesses the FRG's political and economic systems;

The social stratum from which the right-wing radicals draw their support, and the age group for which they have appeal;

How large the potential number of citizens is who are in sympathy with militant actions.

For a whole year the Sinus people gathered and sifted through magazines and leaflets, books and pamphlets. They polled NPD [National Democratic Party of Germany] members and "punks," militant sectarians and members of university fraternities. The results of the "in-depth psychological interviews," a spoken record covering a total of 160 hours, were captured on tape. In addition they polled a representative cross-section of 6,968 eligible West German voters.

To enable them to measure with some degree of accuracy the proclivity toward rightist extremism, the researchers first developed an "Extreme-Rightist Attitude Scale"

(RES) and an "Authoritarian Attitude Scale" (AES), the latter designed to locate "bridges" from extreme-rightist to authoritarian thinking.

Thus, they investigated the question of whether the classic features of extreme-rightist world views — the fuhrer cult, anti-Semitism, excessive nationalism — are still part of the basic ideology and whether new, more recent elements have been added to the old list.

The alarming conclusion: "A total of 13 percent of the electorate (approximately 5.5 million people) have an ideologically absolute, extreme-rightist world view, the mainstays of which are a National-Socialistic view of history, hatred toward alien groups, democracy and pluralism and an exaggerated veneration of nation, fatherland and family."

Moreover, almost half of these extreme right-wingers — or about 6 percent of the electorate — approve of politically motivated violence, up to and including terrorism directed against people. While heretofore it had always been only a question of left-wing terrorist sympathizers, now the extent of the rightist "potential for violence" is becoming evident.

According to the Sinus study, the assumption that right-wing terrorism is simply the doing of loners or screwballs is no longer tenable:

"Violence — up to and including the physical annihilation of the opponent — is an essential trait of extreme-rightist thought and action. The almost mythological veneration of force and the unshakable faith in its power to resolve conflicts and to cleanse characterize the dangerousness of neo-Nazi terrorism in the Federal Republic. The forms of concrete acts of violence and the number of victims are basically random elements here, a question of tactical calculation, since extreme-rightist thinking sets no ethical/moral limits on cruelty. Consequently, criminal attacks that kill indiscriminately, like the one in Munich, and attacks on the quarters of those seeking asylum definitely correspond with the terrible logic of extreme-rightist violence. They are a consequence, not a coincidence."

The Sinus researchers found in the interviews and documents "numerous references" to a growing willingness to use force. Members of militant neo-Nazi groups openly acknowledged that they also wanted to go underground, as a response to leftist terrorism.

The "NSDAP [National-Socialist German Workers Party] Foreign Section," controlled from the United States, propagandizes in pamphlets and journals on the violent overthrow of the "traitorous Bonn regime" and publishes death threats. Anonymous groups solicit financial contributions for criminal acts, using this slogan among others: "Freedom = Out with occupiers! Away with parties! Death to traitors!"

The interviews with members of militant groups also revealed that they want to bring about a fundamental change with "radical means." They call for a nationally authoritarian or openly dictatorial government order, they glorify Hitler and they make light of the persecutions of Jews, or find them "inopportune" at best. Says the Sinus report:



"Dominating the personality of these interviewees is an undisguised macho complex featuring action, toughness and proving oneself. Accordingly, this group classifies the Hoffmann Military Sports Group as the most sympathetic organization. By virtue of their paramilitary activities, extreme-rightist youth organizations like the Viking Youth appear to have a special attraction for this type of person and to have among their members an especially large number of persons with extreme-rightist leanings."

The drift to the right is a varied phenomenon among the FRG citizenry: Trade unionists are less susceptible, while farmers are especially so. Bavaria is at the top of the list of states, but Hesse is also close to the top. An above-average number of right-wing radicals come from villages of between 2,000 and 5,000 people, from small cities and metropolitan suburbs. They frequently have no vocational skills.

The age structure shows a clear preponderance of older people; dominant among those with rightist leanings are people over the age of 50 — the wartime generation, in other words. By contrast, FRG citizens under 40 are largely resistant to any type of neo-Nazism.

Only 4 percent of those who must be counted extreme rightists are between 18 and 21 years of age, while this age group accounts for 8 percent of the electorate. But 20 percent are between 60 and 69 years old (percentage of the electorate: 14 percent). Even potential terrorists are scarcely to be found among the young: Only 5 percent of those polled who favor violence are between the ages of 18 and 21, while 59 percent are over the age of 50.

The Sinus findings indicate that "punks," members of motorcycle gangs and youth sects, who have sometimes been regarded as forerunners of a new extreme-rightist youth movement, constitute only a "fecklessly authoritarian, at heart totally apolitical variety of modern youth escapism."

They know extremely little about politics. They display a "tough facade" which conceals "an amorphous penchant for violence that is directed predominantly toward alien groups (foreigners)":

"The displaying of National-Socialist devotional articles is less a political manifestation than the stylizing of escapism protest on the part of young people. Nonetheless, this protest and the attendant penchant for violence could — at least in individual instances — be diverted and taken advantage of by extreme rightist organizations for their own purposes. We found references to efforts on the part of the Young National Democrats to cultivate motorcycle gangs initially, probably so as to integrate them later on. It is doubtful that this method will be successful in the long run, however, since these gang members and 'punks' exhibit totally contrary thought and behavior patterns in central spheres of extreme-rightist thinking (antimaterialism, criticism of the culture, sexual hostility, patriotic ideology)."

According to the report, the Young National Democrats have a "special role." While the old NPD members have given up hope of reliving the past, the young ones are developing "an avant-garde awareness." Members of this group are showing an increasing propensity for violence, but also a growing sympathy with the Greens.

The Munich opinion pollsters have detected the "Eco-Right" as a new rightist offshoot. It harks back to once-popular ideas of eugenics, homeland and ethnic purity and considers itself part of the Greens movement. Says Sinus:

"A pervasive theme for attitudes on nearly all problem areas is a yearning for an unblemished world that extends not only to environmental protection but also to models of order. Central values are the nation as a natural community and the concept of health in its broadest sense."

The Sinus report says that contacts by extreme rightists with the Greens scene have been increasing of late. For instance, the "Environmental Protection Green Ticket" in the Rhineland-Palatinate was established at the urging of the NPD. The proportion of "Eco-Rightists" in the electorate is substantial: It amounts to 2 percent, which has to be added to the 13 percent share of traditional rightists.

The Sinus authors tried to work up a "basic ideological model" common to all groups: These groups reject fundamental constitutional values as well as the rules of a democratic constitutional state governing the acquisition of political power.

The ideology of extreme rightists is made even clearer by the description of its own values, its fears and aims.

"Substantive backbone" molds a "reactionary view of man": Filled with hate, they reject anything they perceive as alien — young people, sexual minorities and the asocial. They believe that if we could be rid of all slackers and criminals, most problems would be solved. They consider homosexuality "unnatural." If labor camps were to return, "discipline and order" would be a natural result.

According to this right-wing ethic, young people are generally "spoiled." Children should be trained like "puppies," which learn what their limits are from being whipped. Punishment for criminals is too mild; the death penalty must be reinstated; National-Socialist laws should simply have been carried over to make it possible "to take more drastic measures." Quite different methods should be employed against terrorists in particular — speedy trials, concentration camps, the death penalty. The reason: "Nothing else works."

The Bundeswehr — called the "Wehrmacht" by right-wing extremists — is a "bunch of loafers"; the right of conscientious objection, "a constitutional bad seed."

The fight against communism is of overriding importance in the Moon sect, which has a fixation on a Korean messiah; any means appear to be justified in this struggle. But a "final solution" is possible only through World War III, which the Moonies regard as inevitable.

The Sinus researchers also uncovered an abundance of the classic feature of the extreme-rightist attitude — the sense of threat that is perceived in connection with historical and present-day events: It is the fault of the Americans "that everything is topsy-turvy in our country." The "birth defect" of the Federal Republic is the political system that has been forced on it; the leading politicians are nothing but "puppets of the victors." "National forces" are still being suppressed, even today.

Nevertheless, the truly "fatal threat to our nation" is the guest workers who are "taking over" the country, thus placing in jeopardy the existence, the race and the identity of the German people. In their own words: "Pretty soon the Germans will have to crawl into their holes, and the others will be the masters."

The stereotypical arguments: "The foreign workers" are taking work away from the Germans, they're slackers and they're raking in child-support allowances at the expense of the German taxpayer. If things go on this way, a "colossal tragedy" is imminent.

The authors of the Sinus report point out the rejection of social pluralism and the need for harmony as further characteristics of the extreme-rightist picture of the world. Above all, these features show the contrast between the basic values of a democratic society as set forth in the Basic Law and the proclivity for a "fuehrer state": "A single strong party" ought to govern, one which truly represents the interests of all the people. The ruling parties and the trade unions are damaging the common welfare; their quarrels are tearing the community apart.

The parliament is dismissed as inefficient and as an "ineffectual debating club." Politicians are "government scoundrels" or political scoundrels" who do not deserve trust "because every one of them has his secretary on his lap," says an NPD man. "They represent only their own self-interest and their whoring."

The militants who were interviewed strictly reject freedom of thought and speech, but so do the NPD members: Intellectuals, "who only write and don't do anything," and "80 percent of the journalists ought to be locked up immediately."

Democracy, says a militant right-wing extremist tersely, is the "wrong approach." And an NPD member has this to say: "Without pressure and leadership the German is the biggest slob that exists on God's earth." His argument: "We're seeing that right now in Bonn."

Leadership within the state ought again, "as it used to," to be entrusted to a man who is above all party squabbling. This principle of the leader has already been established in the "pecking order" of the animal kingdom; to the Moonies it is "God's will." The ecology groups point to the natural inequality among men.

For a variety of reasons, the "Third Reich" is still in the "nature of a model" for nearly all right-wing extremists. "Those were deeds that you can admire even today," gushes a militant.

Held up as models in numerous interviews are institutions like the National Labor Service, Hitler Youth and Wehrmacht. It is said that the "national community" conveyed a "feeling of security that is missing" today; the state guaranteed "discipline and order."

The inveterate believers freely celebrate Hitler as a hero and statesman. Quotes by Hitler, Goebbels and other Nazis are found in rightist publications just as the words of Marx and Mao appear in those of the left.

Most of them are quite open about approving the persecution of the Jews; some find only the scope to be "exaggerated," while others speak of the "gassing lie."

Anti-Semitism can be found in at least latent form among all extreme rightists; it is an open manifestation with militants and NPD supporters, who deplore the excessive influence of the Jews on the economy and politics.

It is the opinion of many of those polled that Hitler did not want world war. Rather, the blame lies with the Western powers and the German resistance movement; sabotage from within ultimately led to defeat.

The right-wing radicals look wistfully to the past also because at that time the nation, the fatherland and the family still stood for something and satisfied the yearning for harmony and security.

According to the Sinus survey, these concepts are "pathologically overblown"; a general decline in values is bemoaned as "decadence." Materialism and prosperity constitute "moral ruin for the nation" (NPD supporter); the pill and abortion, the wave of pornography, the birthrate decline, alcoholism and crime are signs of the cultural decline. The German character, so goes the demand, should be "kept pure."

Anti-American sentiments are widespread; it is said that after the war the Americans had sought to separate the Germans "from the hitherto established values of nationalism, respectability, tradition, loyalty, patriotism." By re-educating the vanquished, the occupiers "took away their essential nature" and "uprooted them historically." They grafted a foreign culture onto the Germans: "Coca-Cola imperialism, the beat and drug cultures, the disco craze, Hollywood and the jeans craze."

Says an NPD man: "The Americans brought us the Augean Stable." By contrast, according to another, National Socialism "brought peace to the national soul."

The final diagnosis of those who put together the Sinus report is that of a "Siegfried complex": The pride of being a German is combined with criticism of the "puppet government by the grace of America." This complex "bundles together statements that can best be described by the scenario of the upright German hero about to be ambushed on all sides by treacherous, cunning, intelligent enemies. It is here that fear, nationalism, the macho complex and hatred toward foreigners descend into their typical extreme-rightist mix. It is interesting that National Socialism's images of the enemy (leftist journalists, leftist intelligentsia, Freemasons, Jews, foreign countries) have an unbroken and negative symbolic force for the extreme rightist."

To be sure, it is not only extremists who are susceptible to the dissipated and dangerous rightist ideology, but also politically inexperienced citizens who have similar virulent feelings, fears or desires. With the aid of an "authoritarian attitude scale," the pollsters and analysts ferreted out spheres "in which extreme-rightist propaganda might operate with hope of success."

Many Germans prize concepts like loyalty, diligence and a sense of duty as values in themselves; they fear that their lives are being controlled by secret agreements and plans; they think that people are being tainted by increasing luxury, that the egoism of prosperity is destroying the natural feeling for the national community. Says the Sinus report:



"In substance, this scale documents nonspecific feelings of being threatened, of being forsaken, of powerlessness and a lack of direction. Manifesting itself is a cultural pessimism which has an antipluralist, in part antidemocratic tinge. The exclusivity with which the supposedly typically German qualities of loyalty, diligence and sense of duty are claimed for one's own nation is reminiscent of right-wing-extremist ethnocentrism and hatred of foreigners."

This finding appears dangerous to the Sinus people mainly because the extremists could easily take advantage of such a "general mood of feeling forsaken and powerless." The yearning for "national identity" and an unblemished world which is "free of the conflicts of an industrial society" could also be easily reworked. Today's hostility toward foreigners is already showing "how quickly these specific feelings of a threat and political powerlessness can be turned into something concrete and be mobilized politically."

After all, by Sinus standards 37 percent of the people are "disposed toward authoritarianism," though they do reject the Fuehrer cult, militarism and the Nazis. But 18 percent of the West German voters still say this even today: "Germany actually had it better under Hitler."

7458

CSO: 3103

## INFLUENCE OF YOUNG SOCIALISTS SEEN DECLINING

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 14 Mar 81 p 12

[Article by Dieter Wenz: "Young Socialists Facing Dilemma"]

[Text] He did not want to deceive himself, the federal chairman of the Young Socialists finally said, following a talk in the barracks, Bonn's SPD party house: "All these things are also very difficult for me." And Chairman Willi Piecyk, one of the quieter members of the North German SPD which of late has moved into the limelight, is almost unduly tolerated in the Erich-Ollenhauer-Haus, considering the fact that he is a Young Socialist--thus, the question is what are things like within the organization itself, the so-called grassroots.

A possibly cursory opinion, probably not altogether wrong, has been expressed in the following manner: The SPD youth organization will not amount to much as long as the surly Hanseatic Schmidt remains chancellor, as long as he thinks in short translations admired by many short-sighted people, exercising extraordinarily strict control and, in general, ordering stringent measures for others.

Nevertheless, it is probably true that the Young Socialists have lost a lot of their punch--at one time they were a menace to the middle class--they wanted to become "the SPD of the 1980's," according to Karsten Voigt, a rustler in those days who coined the words of the "march through the institutions." And what about Heidemarie Wiczorek-Zeul's "double strategy," which at one time was like infallible red-hot pliers? The influence of the Young Socialists within their own party--the left wing of the SPD, especially the parliamentary one, is by no means excluded--has lost a lot of its power; at the same time, the effect has also been diminished which the young party rebels had on those outside of the party, the extraparliamentary realm which has been wooed by the SPD for a long time.

Of late a few other factors have been added that are intensifying the effects that are not new but have been controversial and disputed for some time, posing an existential threat to those affected. First of all the facts: The explosive bundle of questions--all thrown together under the dubious label of "peace and disarmament"--surrounding public appearances by the Bundeswehr, NATO rearmament and medium-range missiles, the renewed discussion of the neutron bomb which the left wing of the SPD is expecting "with certainty," recent Soviet proposals for a moratorium on armament in Central Europe, models of a West German neutrality



policy (withdrawal from NATO) and the export of weapons. Furthermore, rising unemployment, particularly among young people. Like the topic of the spreading occupation of houses--more factually: rents and residential construction--it is a subject that is not only used by Young Socialists in conjunction with a demand for replacing the market economy. After all, the same applies to energy and environmental policies, which the influential ecological left made the uppermost "problem of humanity."

The new generation of the party can no longer sustain itself in all these areas of the socialist scene outside of the SPD if it wants to stay relatively close to party resolutions, not to mention an interpretation of social democratic policies in loyal support of the chancellor. On the other hand: If the Young Socialists stay far away, they run the danger of being isolated within the party by the chancellor and by the leadership of the party and the fraction.

When considering these weighty "substantive" difficulties, touchy economy measures--in the Ollenhauer-Haus, for instance--are losing some of their bite, although the Bonn office of the Young Socialists lost half of its personnel in the process. Originally--it is symptomatic of what the party leadership thinks of the SPD youth organization today--the planned cuts were even supposed to extend to federal congresses of the Young Socialists; they were to be reduced to meeting no more than every other year. Of greater significance is the following: "If we only present ourselves to the outside with our nuclear energy policy and say to the young people, come and join us, you can work within the organization," Piecyk says, "they will roar with laughter." At best, they are good enough to take part in demonstrations. During the party rally in Berlin toward the end of 1979, the Young Socialists were gnashing their teeth when they agreed with the left wing of the party on a compromise formula concerning the "priority of coal." "Now," the chairman of the Young Socialists points at glass and chrome facades of Bonn's Ollenhauer-Haus, "they do not even want that any longer."

In addition, there are the people of the miserable party scenario. Lately disillusionment has surfaced particularly when it comes to Wehner, the fraction chairman who, according to Piecyk, "was unable to integrate the fraction for as little as five pennies." As far as the Young Socialists are concerned, "the Hansen case is in reality Wehner's doing." In this connection he is talking about a split that is threatening the party. Piecyk says that this talk, at least tactically--in agreement with Brandt--is "nonsense." The truth is that Wehner, who has turned into a nervous fraction chairman, does not know what to do with himself today other than seek salvation in administrative functions and disciplinary actions. A regeneration of the SPD, however, could only take place, "if the party has the courage to engage in discussions with the lower tiers."

Anyway, Brandt has lost a great deal of his magnetic power on the party youth, although he continues to be the one in the so-called social democratic "troika" to whom they feel closest. More and more frequently, however, the expression "credibility deficit" can be heard. We are told in the barracks that the party chairman "is certainly saying the right things, but he is doing nothing." Above all the opinion prevails that he is very careful not to give the impression to the governing fools that he is a killjoy. Finally there is Glotz, Brandt's new

federal manager--does that mean that there is hope? Well, the Young Socialists want to "wait and see how it turns out." They know that he can "talk very intelligently." Nevertheless, it has not been forgotten that following thoughtful lectures during party rallies, "when the time came to vote," Glotz was to be found "again and again among the majority."

And Schmidt? The new generation within the SPD did not have many illusions about the chancellor that could be destroyed. They know that he looks with condescension on the young moralizers in the party. He is the man who at the time of the Berlin party rally, while the delegates were sitting there grinning, told the Young Socialists to be concerned about the bird species in the northern dikes that were in danger of extinction ("You will be surprised how much respect you might earn by doing that!") and who not long ago reasoned in a metallic voice about "the end of welfare benefits" and the "beginning of cruel deeds" in welfare policy.

As matter of fact, Bremen's Mayor Kaschnik had an immediate reply that warmed the hearts of the young left in the party. He remarked that those in power should not only be rational when looking at political problems; they must also recognize the moral aspects. And Wischniewski, Schmidt's confidant, commented on the statement that there should not be a reduction in the SPD's influence on the functions of a "chancellor's party": "Even a party in power must clearly demonstrate what it wants and not only what it can do." As far as a policy is concerned, the demand was made that there should be room, in Eppstein's words, "to represent the overwhelming majority of the Social Democrats." Does this go beyond words? Looking at reality, it is expected that the left wing of the party will have to live with 4 additional years of Schmidt. It is almost impossible to find any young socialist who would disagree with the opinion that the matter is serious and "disastrous"--speeches from the opposition benches which would be the only way to regain strength are tabooed at best.

And, finally, the Young Socialists themselves are in a state of change. The new generation has produced few personalities like Voigt, Roth, Wiczorek-Zeul, Schroeder, Schreiner--and also Albers and Benneter--who at one time were certainly not isolated individuals within their own generation. Chairman Piecyk says that the membership structure has changed: The person who is joining the Young Socialists today is "an entirely different type," approximately 20 years old. "Often they are people with diffuse motivation, and they drop out after the first defeat in the district association." In addition, the elected federal leadership of the Young Socialists has lost much weight; until well into the 1980's they were still able to conduct a kind of secondary government: Recent years have seen a trend toward stronger provinces, land associations and districts, even individual work groups within the association. For some time now they have no longer been willing to do whatever has been concocted by "some guru" in the FRG capital.

The next federal congress of the Young Socialists is to take place at the end of June. There will again be powerful words, formulas will be tossed around. The discussion will again be centered on "Goettingen theses" and "Herford theses" between "reform socialists," "antirevisionists" and "State monopoly capitalism." More than ever it will resemble the quality of a skirmish of a secondary war theater theater of the party.

## PROSPECTS, VIEWS OF ALTERNATIVE PARTY IN BERLIN ELECTION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Mar 81 p 4

[Article by "Ws.": "The 'Alternatives Do Not Want Any Coalition Whatsoever'-- 'Imperative Mandate' Stressed"]

[Text] Berlin, 20 March--The Alternative List for Democracy and Protection of the Environment (AL), which according to a CDU poll could count on 10 percent of the vote if the Berlin elections were held next Sunday, rejects any kind of coalition agreement with the one of the three parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies. It would, however, be prepared to cooperate politically on issues with any of the three parties. This was stated by AL spokesmen in Berlin on Friday [20 March].

However, according to information from the spokesmen, AL circles expect a grand coalition of the SPD and CDU after the 10 May election if the FDP should not make the 5-percent hurdle and the AL should enter parliament. In case it should turn out to be different, with the AL by virtue of its strength turning out to be a decisive factor in the formation of the Senat, an AL plenary assembly would have to decide whether the AL deputies were willing to tolerate a minority government--and if so, what kind. According to its own data, the AL has 1,900 members in Berlin.

In principle the AL, according to the spokesmen, regards itself as a "voice of the extraparlamentarian resistance." Operating on the basis of a broad extraparlamentarian movement, it feels bound by the principle of democracy at the base. If it should enter parliament, it will represent an image of fundamental opposition there, using the Chamber of Deputies as a tribune. Since this might lead to violations of the rules, it is not to be ruled out that the established parties will try to muzzle the AL in parliament, the spokesmen said. Despite the fact that the AL decided that women should be entitled to 50 percent of the seats on all their bodies, the 48 "top candidates" of the AL for the Chamber of Deputies include on 9 women, and there are only 16 women among the 48 "top candidates" for the 12 district assemblies. According to the spokesmen, the AL election campaign budget is DM 300,000.

In the last Berlin elections in 1979, the AL received 47,642 votes for the Chamber of Deputies, or 3.7 percent. It was more successful at the simultaneous elections to the 12 district assemblies, its share of the vote ranging from 1.9 percent in

Spandau to 7.6 percent in Kreuzberg. In the districts of Tiergarten (6 percent, two seats), Kreuzberg (7.6 percent, three seats), Wilmersdorf (5 percent, two seats) and Schoeneberg (7 percent, three seats), the AL managed to get into district assemblies. Of the total of 10 district deputies of the AL, 6 are also running in the 10 May elections. In Zehlendorf the AL did not put up any candidates for the district assembly in 1979, leaving the field to the Electoral Association of Independent Citizens (WUB), which obtained 13.8 percent of the vote and six seats in the district assembly. At the 10 May elections, the AL and the WUB are competing for seats in the Zehlendorf District Assembly. An agreement such as was concluded in 1979 (the AL competing for the Chamber of Deputies, while the WUB tried for seats in the district assembly) did not materialize this time.

According to the AL spokesmen, the AL is governed by the "imperative mandate." This means that its deputies are not only bound by the decisions passed at plenary assemblies of the membership but are also accountable to the "base." Moreover, they say, the AL abides by the rotation principle, with all AL deputies to be replaced in the course of the 4-year legislative period and, in addition to this scheduled change, any deputy subject to replacement by the "base" at any time.

According to AL, the average age of the 96 "top candidates" for the Chamber of Deputies and the 12 district assemblies is 34.5 years. The oldest candidate is the 72-year-old futurologist Flechtheim, professor emeritus of Free University. Two other professors are among the candidates. They also include at least three unemployed and one "houseman," with the most frequent occupations being student, employee and civil servant. A candidate for the Chamber of Deputies in Schoeneberg is the former communist Kunzelmann, and a candidate for the Schoeneberg District Assembly is a Turk, who--unless he has acquired German citizenship in the meantime--is neither entitled to run nor entitled to vote. In Zehlendorf the AL has put up as a candidate for the Chamber of Deputies the lawyer Schily, former counsel for the defense of Horst Mahler and Gudrun Ensslin, while in Tiergarten it has put up as a Chamber of Deputies candidate Gerald Kloepper, who was sentenced to 11 years and 2 months in prison in the Lorenz-Drenkmann trial (the sentence, however, according to his defense attorney, not yet having legal validity). In Steglitz the AL is reported to have selected its candidates in a building occupied by squatters. According to the AL spokesmen, however, Kloepper has disassociated himself from the "2 June Movement" and the urban guerrillas, and the AL does "not (see itself) exclusively as the parliamentary arm of the squatters."

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CSO: 3103



## COMMENTATOR ON CONSEQUENCES OF SQUATTERS, DEMONSTRATORS

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 6 Mar 81 p 1

[Article by Marion Graefin Doenhoff: "The Constitutional State in Danger?--The Consequences of Brokdorf and the Occupation of Buildings in Berlin"]

[Text] Actually no one had figured that the march of the 70,000 to Brokdorf--that symbol of offense--would come off with so little ill effect, for Brokdorf has been shaped into the symbol--nay, the Gessler's hat--of a society which does not want to allow any other concepts of life to be realized than those which have been in vogue since time immemorial. [The Gessler's--Austrian governor's--hat is displayed as a symbol of feudal authority in the 14th century Switzerland of Schiller's "Wilhelm Tell."] The SPD and CDU, authorities and demonstrators, courts and journalists--almost all had thought it would come to scuffles, riots and brutalities of all kinds. No one would have been surprised if some dead had been left on the battlefield in the end.

The universal admiration for the peaceful demonstrators, who contributed a great deal to restraining those bent on violence, and the praise for the police, who proceeded in this difficult situation in a tactically astute, officially calm and humanly circumspect manner, are fully justified and well deserved. But once everyone's relief about this has vanished, the tough, fundamental questions will come to the fore again.

What will become of this state, the jeremiads of many citizens will say, which issues a ban that is transgressed by 70,000 people without anything happening as a result? And not only that! On top of it, the authorities are even grateful and quite touched that at this event only 128 police were injured, 2 water cannons destroyed, and only the building of a sewage plant set on fire.

## Escalation of Violence

And people will say further: How can the constitutional state survive if by now more than 100 buildings have been occupied illegally in Berlin and the Senat--in other words, the city government--emphatically requests the Land court prosecutor's office to be lenient in its prosecution but then the latter, on the contrary, disregarding this request by the head of government, prevails with a complaint against the fact that a student was not held liable for damages? Or if conversely the chief of police, rather than complying with a prosecutor's order to search an

occupied building within 1 week, requests a delay because he thinks that at this time this would lead to an "incalculable escalation of violence"? Does this mean, many will ask, that today anyone can do whatever he wants?

Certainly the minister-president of Schleswig-Holstein would have been able to station the enormous police forces at his disposal at the point where the prohibited zone began--in other words, 4 or 5 kilometers before the reactor territory--and could have ordered anyone setting foot across this line to be clubbed down. Of course the governing mayor of Berlin could have had all buildings cleared by using force and employing tear gas. But what would be the result? Embitterment without equal, particularly on the part of the young generation. An escalation of fury and brutality no one can stop any more. It would amount to fostering terrorism. Just like that, small intellectually lost groups which committed specific terrorist actions--such as we experienced in 1977--in a city like Berlin, characterized by antiquation and subculture, might develop into terrorism on a mass scale. The final result would be a police state. Who would benefit from it?

Of course, it is justified to ask what will become of the constitutional state if bans are no longer obeyed, and crimes no longer punished. Only, one has to realize that the constitutional state can come into play in a variety of ways. While it can be ruined by lack of order, of obedience to the law and of discipline, it can also be drilled to death by absolutizing legal paragraphs or statutes--as in the case of the Radicals' Decree--or by rigidly adhering to competencies--no occupation of buildings even if hundreds of them stand empty for years and thousands of people cannot find any housing. Both ways--fiat justitia, pereat mundus [let justice prevail though the world go under]--in the end can lead to the kind of police state no one wants.

#### The World in Which We Live

We are living in times very remote from those in which a high civil servant, when asked while about to die what he was thinking, replied, "Of the state." No one thinks of the state any longer. Today most people think primarily of themselves, care primarily for their own well-being and consider only their own concepts, judgments and ideas right and proper.

At one time, "in the olden days," there was an upper class which complemented and reproduced itself from its own resources, which inherited its system of values and its rules and passed them on with only slight changes. In our open society, which recruits its leading elements in a quite different way and in which education and enlightenment reach into all strata of the population, there reigns a much greater plurality and flexibility as regards value concepts and rules.

While some may deplore the lack of principles and the nonexistence of an obligatory system of values and may find this state of affairs obnoxious, perhaps even anarchic, this nevertheless is the world in which we live. This is the society within which policy has to be made and which is governed by conditions of socialization that are quite different from the previous ones.



What good would it do to Governing Mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel to follow every letter of the law but at the same time lose the ability to govern the city? What use is it for the politicians in Bonn, Schleswig-Holstein, or wherever, to say that in a representative democracy like ours the elected representatives of the people determine whether we need nuclear energy and need or need not build reactors? What use is it for them to say: We must now allow just any groups of the population to arrogate the right to have a say outside this constitutional framework and to block decisions that have been made?

Sure, if everyone were to take the law into his own hands, soon only the brutal elements would be in the right and would prevail on the basis of might being right and the weak would simply be left stranded, but this is not the way it is.

Surely we do not have a situation where those in power know everything and take care of things perfectly and the citizens actually only interfere. Precisely in Berlin it was shown how miserable the quality of government was. How would it have been possible otherwise for public institutions to buy up buildings in large numbers, not to restore them or tear them down and put new ones in their place, but simply to let them stand empty and wait for an improvement in the economic situation? Incidentally, that building which was to be cleared within a week has been under occupation for more than a year--since February 1980! So we did have a situation where the (first gently exercised) force of the building occupiers drew attention to an untoward state of affairs which otherwise might have continued for years.

#### Cassandra Visions

And in nuclear energy too the many citizens' initiatives led to improvements. Citizens' initiatives corrected an apparently innocent decision by the people's representatives who said that, unable to judge the question of nuclear energy, they would have to depend on the scientists' judgment (not knowing whether the scientists perhaps unthinkingly were pulling the same string as industry). Many security regulations making our reactors more secure than those of other countries were issued. Successful economies in energy too are due to the fact that such activities had a share in orienting the consciousness of the population toward economizing.

The Cassandra visions of those who see the constitutional state in ruin or think representative democracy can no longer cope with the problems facing us are not creative visions, which do exist, but highly unproductive ones which prevent people from thinking about ever new possibilities and solutions. Let no one think that the Basic Law provides standard solutions for coping with problems and conflicts. Even the best constitution provides only the framework for politicians to show their imagination and skill.

There is no question but that it is possible to cope with the problems facing us also within the framework of the democratic constitutional state. The past weekend offers definitely hopeful prospects, for it turned out that both sides understood which way the wind was blowing. Those in power have to balance repression and permissiveness on an edge that has become narrow. Those who want to attain

alternative life styles without conjuring up a police state have to see to it that their ranks are not penetrated by brutal opositles of violence. Neither is easy.

If both sides realize that only together can they survive in freedom or that together they can steer into a police state, and if both sides act accordingly, nothing can really go wrong.

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CSO: 3103

## VARYING APPROACHES TO CONTINUING SQUATTER PROBLEM

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 16 Mar 81 pp 26-29

[Article: "'Anarchy Can Succeed, Old Man'"]

[Text] To take firm action or to continue with restraint--since the comprehensive blow by the Bavarians against Nuernberg youths, the differences between and within the parties in the dispute about the squatters have been more pronounced than ever. The citizens too are split: while there is increasing sympathy for the motives of the squatters, discomfiture about the methods is growing to the same degree.

At the cabinet conference table in Bonn, Social Democratic Federal Minister of Justice Juergen Schmude pleaded for restraint, but what he had to say was not to the liking of all the ministers by any means.

Squatting, demonstrations, youth riots, Schmude lectured to the SPD-FDP government team, simply were no reason to lose one's balance--for instance, to tighten the law governing demonstrations, as the CDU/CSU is demanding. "Rigorous action is not what counts," he said.

A few party colleagues of the minister were not so sure. Hans Apel, Herbert Ehrenberg and Egon Franke registered reservations. "Squatting just is unlawful," one of them objected. The law surely must be maintained in every case, said another. Simply to give protesting youth a free hand appeared to be tantamount to "retreating in the face of force."

FDP colleague Gerhart Baum, on the other hand, applauded Schmude. Application of the penal code, the minister of the interior argued, was but the "ultima ratio" of society in handling conflicts; it was necessary to see not only infractions of the law but the reasons for them. Legality pure and simple does not accomplish anything, the Liberal minister said; "one has to put up with technical violations of the law in this kind of situation."

In the end, the cabinet agreed on one term contributed by the chancellor: according to Helmut Schmidt, the police action in Nuernberg was definitely "excessive."

There remained some doubt, however, as to what the right response to the youth unrest was to be.

The cabinet wants to discuss the justice minister's concept once more before Schmude expounds the government position on the subject of squatters in the Bundestag legal policy debate scheduled for Thursday this week.

What for a long time had been seen to be a municipal problem, to be something that senators in Berlin or police officials in Freiburg had to worry about, since the comprehensive action of the Bavarians had become once for all a dispute about national legal concepts--regardless of the fact that by the end of last week squatting had not assumed nationwide proportions by any means.

True, there was hardly any metropolis in which some old buildings had not been taken over, but in many places this has come to a familiar feature, and here and there, it appears, understanding for it is spreading among citizens as well as mayors.

It is true that only in a few cases are the squatters themselves seeking housing. They often come from well-off middle-class families, and what they may lack at most is accommodations where young men and women can date without interference. There is also no question but that squatting is an expression of a general protest by youth against the establishment, that many squatters want to renovate radically not only the premises but all of society. Nevertheless they have signaled deplorable conditions in urban centers.

Tens of thousands of people are looking for housing in densely populated FRG areas, both in the Nuernberg-Fuerth-Erlangen triangle and in the Rhein-Main area, while buildings worth preserving are standing empty in the inner districts of cities. Those affected by the housing shortage generally are old people and persons on their own, the socially weak, the prolific and aliens, who need inexpensive housing because of their low income.

This may explain why many citizens do not like the method of the squatters, not to speak of their dress. And it has happened--in Ravensburg last Friday--that eggs, otherwise rather a weapon of the opposite side, were flung at sympathizing demonstrators.

The publicized aims of the squatters are gaining ground, however. As many as 39 percent of people in the FRG polled by the Wahlen research institute of Mannheim regarded squatting as a sensible way of using real estate. And a majority of 63 percent even wants to give the state the right to distribute empty housing to persons seeking accommodations even over the objections of the owners.

Whether violence erupts, and to what extent it does so, apparently is determined by a variety of factors--by the social structure of an urban area as well as the quality of urban planning, by whether there is a university (and thus ample youth protest potential) in the area and also by the way the official counterforce is applied.

Similarly as in the student unrest of the 1960's, squatting and youth riots have not really extended to the most populous FRG Land, North Rhine-Westphalia. The roughly 20 occupations of buildings between Duesseldorf, Gelsenkirchen, Muenster and Wuppertal have been proceeding without any use of force whatever, and there has been no court decision to vacate.

The first time force was used was last week in Aachen and Cologne, where rocks were flying and panes smashed, and where people were injured and arrests were made following an unannounced demonstration. But when about 100 demonstrators finally gathered before the Cologne Police Presidium, the demonstration turned into a kind of people's fair. In pouring rain the participants danced to radio music, played soccer and toasted one another. Cologne Chief of Police Egon Schultze: "Here many demonstrations bear a startling resemblance to the carnival."

Aachen Mayor Clemens Glaesser explains the relative quiet by pointing to the better housing situation in North Rhine-Westphalia. "In Berlin," Glaesser says, "100 municipally owned residential buildings are standing empty. Here there are not even 10 percent of such buildings. Moreover, in Aachen every student has found accommodations."

But even where students at the beginning of the term occasionally have had to spend the night in cars and railroad waiting rooms (such as in Mainz) or have occupied the staff building of a barracks (as in Tuebingen), squatters and owners have reached amicable agreements so far.

Towns where cases of houses with boarded-up windows and nailed-shut doors are rarest are those where the authorities with money and ideas have prevented speculation and wrecking in antiquated residential complexes. In Duesseldorf the municipality turned over gratis to the "Housing Shortage Action" more than 300 dilapidated buildings, in which until further notice accommodations are distributed to college and high school students and apprentices without a lease.

In Hamburg, the largest FRG municipality, squatting "so far has been only a fringe phenomenon," Detmar Mueller-Landre of the building authority says, "because Hamburg countered the housing problems with renewal programs at a very early date." With SIKS (Urban Renewal in Small Steps), Mueller-Landre hopes, the Senat "took earlier and more intensive countermeasures"--3,000 to 3,500 apartments being modernized annually with public funds.

In the Frankfurt speculators' district Westend (where years ago police and squatters waged furious street battles because residential buildings were being wrecked to make room for banks and office buildings), problem addresses have in the meantime become more scarce. And if it happens, as in Sachsenhausen the week before last, that strangers move into an empty building without bothering about keys or a lease, CDU Chief Mayor Walter Wallmann, a couple of weeks before the municipal elections, does not immediately think of eviction.

In Wiesbaden too, where the CDU also governs with an absolute majority, CDU politicians are handling squatters and citizens' initiatives with much greater circumspection than their CDU colleagues in Baden and Bavaria. When last week in the



capital of Hesse squatters made themselves at home in an empty building right next to the Landtag, Christian and Social Democrats jointly climbed through the ground floor window to negotiate with the intruders about voluntary vacation and alternative municipal accommodations.

Of course, there are examples aplenty of it also being possible to settle the dispute in a different way. In Munich, where the police expel people resolutely and (according to Chief of Police Manfred Schreiber) "no building remains occupied for longer than 24 hours," or in Heidelberg, where the municipal administration does not tolerate "breaking the law under the guise of moral demands," according to Chief Mayor Reinhold Zundel, occupations are "prevented through prudent but determined action."

In Freiburg Secretary for the Interior Robert Ruder after some nighttime rioting ordered several companies of emergency police from all over Baden-Wuerttemberg to clear the "Schwarzwaldhof," an area--occupied for 8 months--consisting of 14 residential buildings, workshops, a cultural center, Punk (meaning unknown) sheds and children's shops. A total of 91 squatters were led away.

Now, since the mass arrests in Nuernberg supported by the Land government in Munich, Bavaria and Berlin apparently have taken a stand in support of a "different concept of the state," as SPD federal executive manager Peter Glotz put it. The new Berlin SPD chairman says: "The wall separating the two big political trends in our country has suddenly become visible."

Nuernberg and Kreuzberg--those now appear to be the places symbolizing the not brand new dispute as to who does the best job securing the constitutional state--he who defends it with brute force or he who is inclined to ignore breaches of the law because the revolt against indisputably deplorable conditions, "though not legal, does appear to be morally legitimate" (Glotz).

"We take the law as seriously as a minister of justice has learned to do," said SPD Governing Mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel, defending himself in the SPD Presidium against charges by the Bavarians that the Prussians were taking it much too easy. The Berlin Senat, he said, was trying to "prevent youths from dropping out and to leave the door open for them to return," but he was "greatly concerned that actions like those in Nuernberg might drive many youths irrevocably into a confrontation with state and society."

Having dealt more and longer with the occupation of buildings than any other municipal governments, Berlin's SPD-FDP rulers are ready for "pacification talks on all channels." Thus the planned, clearing of an occupied Gruenderzeit [early 1870'2] building in middle-class Schmargendorf was canceled when Senat lawyers expressed the opinion that the deadline for the wrecking applied for by the private owner had expired some days before, and that there was therefore no reason any longer for the police to take any action. And last Wednesday, when a wrecking squad approached to take care of the scheduled razing of some old Kreuzberg factory premises, the squatters, for their part, had given in. They had moved out.



SPD politicians, such as Berlin's new Senator for the Interior Franz Dahrenndorf, think that excessively bellicose action by the police is frustrating their efforts to put "the shaken legal consciousness of young people" who do not comprehend squatting to be a breach of the law "on the right track again." Strauss' claim that the "core of a new terrorist movement" is thus being protected from prosecution is not endorsed by the SPD and FDP either in Berlin or in Bonn.

"A completely mistaken whitewashing of terrorists and a completely mistaken criminalization of squatters!" an upset Federal Minister of Justice Schmude told the cabinet. This week the chairman of the Bundestag Committee for Internal Affairs, SPD Deputy Axel Wernitz, wants Minister of the Interior Baum to tell him whether someone who has forcibly occupied a building in fact can be regarded as a "new kind of terrorist."

The FDP's Baum has already had his experts confirm to him that while persons from the terrorist environment have been trying time and again to undermine the squatters' scene, "squatters basically are not interested in such influence and in terrorist aims."

Nor is there, according to the Federal Criminal Police Bureau, any evidence of any central guidance of demonstrations and squatting "by organizations from such areas as those of antifascists, Spontis or undogmatic leftists." Wernitz sums it up as follows: "By trying to isolate idealist fellow travelers from the hard core of the rioters, one reaches the opposite result with such wholesale suspicions."

The united terrorist purpose cited by BILD and mentor Strauss--a "wholesale RAF [Red Army Faction]"--does not exist anywhere on the squatters' scene. Behind the barricaded doors of occupied buildings, there rules, if anything, the shaky mood of a fortification family finding itself confronted by a world of enemies--the power of the state in uniform, the legal owners and disgruntled neighbors who have no use for brisk slogans ("Anarchy Can Succeed, Old Man").

They are a motley of groups, the people hammering away in ramshackle buildings, saving, painting walls, laying bricks and moving in, mattress on mattress--from middle-class families but also young unemployed who have not finished school, high school students and dropouts. In the respective building council, where strategy and tactics and also the banal concerns of communal life are discussed, there therefore always reigns, in the words of one Berlin squatter-restorer, "pluralism or, one might say, confusion."

Many of the protesters no longer want to have anything to do with mayors, municipal councilors, deputies, legal advisers and renewers. One young Kreuzberg man says about local management: "Those old fogies stink as far as we are concerned; let them leave us in peace."

So it is questionable whether the dialog with the squatters aimed at by the Berlin rulers will be able to get going. After Nuernberg, the gap between those inside and those outside appears greater than ever.

And, all disgruntlement about the housing shortage and deplorable renewal conditions notwithstanding, the people too apparently are having less use for long speeches. There exists a latent suspicion anyway that it is a question here not so much of social concerns as of revolutionary ones. There exists a profound fear that once the squatter-restorers are tolerated, that will not be the end of it. At least in Berlin, where by now the 113th building has been occupied and where the confrontation is a vivid experience like nowhere else, neither officials nor citizens can understand why the Senat certifies moral justification to most of the squatters and restrains the police.

"Polit-rockers, rioters and muggers, flipped-out people and scoundrels are being protected by the state from the difficulties of daily life and enjoying public pity," complains an open letter from 42 policemen to the senator for internal affairs. And at many a bar in Kreuzberg, sound popular feeling culminates in one word: "Home guard."

After the occupation of the building at 28 Dieffenbachstrasse, for instance, almost 200 volunteers headed by construction workers congregated to "liberate" the remaining tenants and a corner shopkeeper. In the occupied building at 74 Goerlitzer Strasse, tradesmen used picks and crowbars to try to open the barricaded door, desisting only after their boss called them back.

For self-defense, it was reported in the planning committee of the Kreuzberg local assembly, some shopkeepers have got themselves guns by now. And squatters have detected "fascist gangs of rowdies" in Kiez--a rightwing counterforce, as it were.

So far the police have disputed evidence that reaction is now also on the march in Kreuzberg. What is certain, however, is that the squatter boom has called pros of quite a different kind on the scene.

In a box-number advertisement in the BERLINER MORGENPOST Sunday before last, for example, affected building owners were asked to "make discreet contact." The offer: "Freeing of your property in case of illegal occupation."

Nor do Berlin police want to rule out any longer the possibility that "liberators of buildings who have arrived from Amsterdam"--raiding squads, in other words, who earned their keep in the Netherlands in short order--now also have discovered a gap in the market in Berlin.

8790

CSO: 3103

## EANES' DUAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL, MILITARY POWERS

## Military, Civilian Powers Merged

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 31 Jan 81 p 2

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa]

[Text] 1. The Changing of the Guard

Adhering to a traditional lesson in politics, the reelected president of the republic did not waste much time drawing some fundamental inferences from the situation brought about by the victory of 7 December 1980.

In fact, a traditional principle is that the one who is in a position of strength must not waste any time adopting the essential policy measures, especially those which could evoke considerable unfavorable reaction.

Now President Antonio Ramalho Eanes emerged from the 7 December elections a winner on two counts:

On one count, Eanes won a victory over his civilian political adversaries;

On the other count, Eanes defeated his adversaries in the military realm, specifically those who had backed the candidacy of Gen Soares Carneiro, either overtly or covertly.

Hence, he was equipped to start adopting policy positions aimed at reinforcing his status in Belem.

The first step, because it was the most difficult, related to the Armed Forces, of which Eanes is chief of staff [CENGFA].

The president of the republic did not wait very long to proceed with the changing of the guard.

## 2. The Price of the Presidential Elections

In the first place, the fundamental logic behind the substitutions that have already been made and those that have been announced is related to the results of the

presidential elections, and also to their corollary, namely, the commitment which Eanes must keep to give up the post of CEMGFA.

Accordingly, President Eanes is steering the shifts of military chiefs in the direction of guaranteeing that individuals in his complete personal and political confidence will be assigned to key positions.

A good criterion for gaging that confidence is the attitude assumed by the various military chiefs toward the recent presidential elections.

The notion that the Armed Forces are, or ever were, neutral from a political standpoint on the national scene, as we have written several times, is a fiction, in addition to being quite incompatible with the actual political dimensions that they have assumed in our country during recent years.

Hence, Eanes' choices are not politically neutral choices, but are obviously based on a criterion of confidence which entails, among other things, the exclusion of all those who gave excessive support to the alternate presidential candidate.

What happened to Pedro Cardoso is an expected, and perhaps inevitable example of the price that some military chiefs would have to pay for not totally backing the presidential candidate who became the winner.

### 3. Subordination to the Civilian Authority

But President Eanes did not confine himself to bearing in mind that lesson from our political history to the effect that it is essential for anyone who wants to keep his power intact in Portugal to dominate the Armed Forces, if possible, in an unobtrusive manner, and through individuals in his strict personal confidence.

With this swift action of his in the military area, President Eanes also revealed his awareness of another essential notion: that of legitimizing choices made on the basis of personal confidence, and seeking to back a political guarantee with arguments upholding the subordination of the military authority to the civilian authority, and the absence of political criteria underlying the selection of the military chiefs.

It is what might be called the quintessence of political activity.

On the one hand, Eanes is so "sure" of the military chiefs that, even if he gives up the post of CEMGFA, he can retain control of key positions in the Armed Forces through intermediaries.

On the other hand, he delivered a very well devised speech at the swearing-in of Garcia dos Santos, in which he lectured on the Armed Forces' intervention in political activity, mentioning the purity of ideals, and the subordination of the military institution to the democratically legitimized civilian political authority.

From his viewpoint, it would be a mistake if Eanes were to do one of two other things:

1. Take this profession of faith of his to its final consequences, and leave the CEMGFA without having changed some of the military commands, while there was still time, so as to guarantee his influence in the Armed Forces;

2. Change the military chiefs on the basis of criteria of personal and political confidence, and deliver a speech in which he overtly declared that this is what should have been done.

Eanes was far more subtle: He did not avoid adopting (through a "low profile" Council of the Revolution) the politicomilitary measures that he deemed necessary, with maneuvering room unparalleled in European nations, where no CEMGFA is at the same time (newly elected) president of the republic; and then he explained to the Portuguese people that the Armed Forces were ready to move to a position of actual subordination to the constitutionally established organs of sovereignty (of which it may be anticipated the Council of the Revolution will cease to be a member).

#### 4. The Following Steps

But the procession is still going on in the churchyard.

Eanes has been careful not to make all the changes at once, preferring shifts at slow intervals.

This has sufficed to cause our generals and admirals to spend a few more weeks in metaphysical anxiety, owing to the "suspense" of not knowing what is in store for them with respect to the position that they will hold.

Thus, Eanes made his power quite evident.

ie changes have not followed an order that would perhaps have been more logical, one that would begin with the replacement of the CEMGFA. Eanes chose to appoint other commands first, and not until after that would he replace himself with an individual in his confidence.

Thus, Eanes is demonstrating his tractability.

It might be added that one cannot anticipate that the FRS [Socialist Republican Front], bound by its commitment to President Eanes, will agree to vote in the revision of the Constitution that the CEMGFA is to be appointed and dismissed by the government.

Thus, it will continue to be the president of the republic who has the decisive say regarding the CEMGFA.

At the same time, it is no coincidence that some members of the Council of the Revolution have already begun claiming that the subordination of the military authority to the civilian authority is essential, but that the civilian authority should also include, in addition to the Assembly of the Republic and the government, the president of the republic himself; an idea which, moreover, was commented on by the Socialist deputy, Salgado Zenha, in the parliamentary debate on the government program.



Thus, the series of arguments aimed at guaranteeing the president of the republic a position of considerable significance insofar as the Armed Forces are concerned, in the forthcoming constitutional revision, has been reinforced.

It will be necessary to wait and see how this twofold, simultaneous task undertaken by President Eanes, namely, that of preparing for his successor as CEMGFA while at the same time guaranteeing himself influence over the Armed Forces in the future, will turn out.

In this context, one can understand the critical concern revealed in the AD [Democratic Alliance] over the changes in military commands that are under way, a cautious but significant example of which is EXPRESSO's interview with Antonio Capucho, representing the first unofficial reaction from government sectors to an issue that is very much in focus.

#### 5. The Constitutional Revision Is Approaching

We mentioned the constitutional revision previously, and one of the most heated issues in the parliamentary debates can hardly fail to revert to the matter of the Armed Forces' position with respect to the political authority.

In these terms, but not only therein, public opinion has been devoting increased attention to the problem of the constitutional revision.

There is every indication that March may be the 30-day period following the submission of the first bill on revision, within which all the others must be deposited.

Until then, the prospects associated with the various political parties with seats in Sao Bento do not differ greatly from what we predicted on this very page nearly a month ago.

As we wrote then, it is likely that AD will take the first step in the revision process, by submitting a complete plan on the subject.

#### 6. PSD: Obvious Unanimity

The CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] took under consideration the plan devised by Diogo Freitas do Amaral, in which some changes were made, to be incorporated into the final version suggested by the Centrists.

As for the PSD [Social Democratic Party], what was easy to predict as early as mid-December has been confirmed: There was unanimity regarding the idea of stressing substantially the parliamentary inclination of the Portuguese Government system, resulting in a plan for constitutional revision different from that proposed by Diogo Freitas do Amaral, and destined for subsequent negotiation with AD.

The unanimity occurred both among the party's constitutionalists and among its national political leaders, who will quite likely have already approved a final version of the PSD position by the end of next week.

This unanimity includes both those who, before the twofold election, were already upholding the parliamentarization of the government system (either for theoretical

reasons, or to reinforce the role of the head of government (then Francisco Sá Carneiro), and those who at the time considered such a proposition politically unfeasible, particularly because it was submitted at a time when AD was backing a presidential candidate of its own, weakening the latter's position, but who now agree with the greater parliamentary inclination after the electoral victory of President Ramalho Eanes has occurred.

In the end, there will have to be reconciliation among the positions of the PSD and CDS, and also the PPM [Popular Monarchist Party], from which the AD's complete plan will emerge by the end of February.

Therefore, there were no surprises insofar as the majority and its member parties were concerned, nor any substantial material for major political deliberations, apart from a few (always chronic and 'festing') episodes of little importance, possibly associated with inevitable personal vanity, group promotion or juvenile desires for more or less unrestrained affirmation (which at times also gave the impression of representing campaigns from outside directed inside the university institution, preposterously involving the institution which has traditionally reacted so badly to this type of personal or political campaign).

As for the opposition, everything is proceeding as was to be expected also.

The PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] is preparing its response to the AD bill, and its major political objective still seems to be that of firmly guaranteeing the least possible change in the Constitution that is in force, "wooing" the PS [Socialist Party] for this purpose.

#### 7. The PS' Nuclear Position

As for the PS, its position on the constitutional revision in general, and on the issue of the Armed Forces' inclusion in particular, continues to be nuclear. Two thirds make it obligatory....

Recent weeks appear to indicate a decline in a potential parliamentarizing trend within the PS, as well as a certain amount of hardening with respect to the economic organization of the state.

These realities may be both essential phenomena, which would mean some sacrifice in the positions of FRS sectors that would prefer more moderate types of compromise, and in particular might mean that the Socialists are reacting for reasons based on the current situation.

If this were the case, they would stiffen their positions until the Congress (for example, this might be the tactic of Mario Soares, allied with the "historicals," making a leftist speech to reinforce his negotiating clout for the Congress).

And, at the same time, the PS would respond to the PSD's position, by radicalizing its attitudes on the constitutional revision in an opposite direction.

It might be claimed that we are confronted with a tactical position designed to make heavy demands so as also to be able to negotiate considerably. If confirmed, this would make the FRS' initial proposals (and certainly those of AD) proposals

deliberately very far removed from the one that might be the final compromise in the revision of the Constitution.

We need only follow with redoubled interest the effect of the PS' internal vicissitudes on the definitive content of the proposals for alteration that the Socialists will make in the bill submitted by the AD and, in the final analysis, in the text of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic itself.

#### Revolutionary Council, Civilian Power

Lisbon O TEMPO in Portuguese 29 Jan 81 p 10

[Article by military affairs specialist F.A.: "The Hour of the Pretorians"]

[Text] As we predicted a few weeks ago, under the title "O Prec em banho-Maria" and as we noted last week in "A subordinacao ao poder civil" (although, on that occasion, something still remained to be said), it is quite clearly in evidence: the great offensive of the CR's [Council of the Revolution] majority wing, which apparently coincides at present with President Eanes' hypothetical plan for personal power.

At a time when we were beginning to discern possibilities of a consensus between AD and PS with a view toward the constitutional revision, and at a time when the (now) No 1 enemy of the CR (and hence of Belem), the secretary general of PS, Mario Soares, is beginning to take the helm of his party again, the CR feels threatened with danger, the greatest danger that it may ever face: becoming completely dispensable; which means that its abolishment is considered a natural event.

Under these conditions (and despite all the demonstrations, public and otherwise, of peaceful acceptance of that natural aspect) the CR perforce had to act speedily and violently, and that is exactly what it is doing.

In fact, immediately after Eanes' reelection, the most ardent "Eanists" began "asking for the heads" of the military who were most prominent in their backing for Soares Carneiro. A photo printed in the weekly publication O DIABO served as the starting point. It showed its editor offering Soares Carneiro a copy of his book "Eanes Never Again" and, below, Col Barroso de Moura, from the Military Academy, and Lt Col Antonio Coimbra, from the PSP. There were targets; action was to be taken without delay. However, other more moderate individuals discovered that the photo was merely accidental, because it was taken at the exit of the St Jerome Monastery at the conclusion of the Mass for the intentions of the military of the Commando Regiment who were killed on 25 November. So, everything was postponed until a better occasion when, in a more subtle manner, the Armed Forces were given the severe "scolding" that they deserved for not having been willing to back the second candidacy.

And because, as we said in our last issue, it is of particular concern to guarantee the control of the Armed Forces just when the government and the parties are trying to carry out the subordination of the military to the civilian authority, the shifts among the military chiefs immediately started.

For this purpose (and to begin with), the top echelons of the Army were actually "decapitated": Gen Pedro Cardoso (chief of the EME [Army General Staff]), Duarte Silva (deputy chief), Almiro Canelhas (adjutant-general) and Lopes da Conceicao (quartermaster) and Brig Vergas Rocha (finance) were dismissed; Gen Salazar Braga's functions were changed; and (as a supreme provocation for the government), Gen Lopes Alves, whom the former AD government removed from political confidence and dismissed from the PSP after a long dispute with Belem, was appointed deputy chief of the EME.

Within a few weeks, the command of the Lisbon and Coimbra Military Regions, of the Santa Margarida Brigade, of the Military Academy and of the GNR [Republican National Guard] is also due to change, as is the presidency of the Superior Military Court. Will the commanders of the Evora (Brig Ricardo Durao) and Porto (Gen Mario Delgado) Military Regions, and those of many other important units, be retained? And what will happen in the Air Force and the Navy?

In the Air Force, it is known that the CR attempted to dismiss Gen Lemos Ferreira, but did not succeed in obtaining agreement from a single general to replace him under the present circumstances: in the Air Force (unlike the Army), there are no "political" generals of (that is, in) the CR!

A deeper analysis of all these changes warrants our concluding that, while he was signing political "truces" with the government, the president of the republic wanted to show, without any room for doubt, that it was he who was in command of the Armed Forces.

However, not even the most pessimistic persons ever thought that he would go so far. Nevertheless, and although the deeply negative effects of all this upheaval in the Armed Forces are admitted, it is a widespread conviction that they will not allow themselves to be "pretorianized." In fact, the regiments are disciplined and united; the military march gallantly in perfect parade, with their hair cut and their gold braid shining. Therefore, when they return to the ranks, the CR's present "chosen ones" will not have anything to change, except probably the hopes that the Council members placed in them.

This was the case with Pires Veloso, then with Rocha Vieira, and later with Pedro Cardoso, all chosen by the CR with obvious intentions; but who ended up opting for the Armed Forces in the constant battle that put them in opposition to the politico-military organ which has often tried to use them.

It would not surprise us if, within a few weeks, these same Council members were to begin disliking the essentially "military" behavior of the new CEME [Army Chief of Staff], Garcia dos Santos. On that occasion, they would quickly appoint a replacement for his present position on the CR, taking from him the privilege of "lifetime tenure" which now applies to him, in violation of the provision in the Constitution calling for the affirmation of such unswerving guardians.



## Psychology of Eanes' Strategy

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 29 Jan 81 p 10

[Article by a member of the military: "Eanes' Strategy"]

[Text] What is going on in Eanes' mind? The least that can be said is that, with the passage of time, his actions, attitudes and behavior have been marked by personal ambition, particularly with respect to power.

An excessive craving for power, conceived as a lifetime, imperial type, can readily be observed in Eanes, wherein the essence of things is camouflaged by outward appearances.

Actually, what Eanes wants is to be a Napoleon on a Portuguese scale, with friends, relatives and others typified by the same manner of thinking and acting.

This fact explains his conduct over a period of time, and shows why he was elected by a certain majority in 1976, and by another in 1980, different from the first. In other words, the bloc of support matters little to Eanes, provided he obtains what he wants: power.

A serious risk results from this because, after all, Eanes is a believer in "the end justifies the means," especially if this evidence of his action can be concealed and downplayed. In view of the fact that a large portion of public opinion is always in a state of flux and uninclined to question, this general style affords him a wide margin for maneuvering.

Moreover, since he is a man who engaged for some time in psychological activity in Africa, he is aided by his experience in this field of activity, one of marked speciousness. Since this activity is always based on the immutability of principles, wherein the ostensible features change in accordance with the context, the result is that what held true then in Africa holds true now in Portugal. It is the processes and the means that are different.

What has been said sheds light on two essential matters: The first is the clear, obvious danger associated with a personality of this type, inasmuch as no political plan exists. And, as we all know, it is far easier to combat a political plan with another political plan than to try to thwart any personal plan for power, with indefinite features.

There are also aggravating factors which the indefiniteness itself and the lack of clarity have later shown in the essential ambiguities, at the moment always pointing to the benefit of the doubt.

Added to this is the trait of sound judgment of the personage which is often interpreted by the public as integrity and honor; whereas, in fact, the appearance of itself alone does not determine the real nature of the personage.

The second point is that, in order to execute his plan for personal power, and since no ethics are observed in the selection of methods, everything is negotiable, whether it be military, political or economic positions. In other words, the plan is also commercial, since it implies that willingness and solutions can be bought. It is also obvious that goals of the type of those described require and depend greatly on a favorable image among the public in general.



Therefore, access to public opinion and the possibility of being able to guide it in a direction favorable to the ambitions of Ramalho Eanes' plan cannot do without the backing provided by the news media. Hence, also, the constant references by Eanes and his closest backers to the aforementioned news media, claiming that their independence is necessary, whereas, in reality, what is sought is greater dependence, but of a contrary type.

It is for this reason that Ramalho Eanes makes public reference to this, attempting to make possible the creation of an openness toward possible subsequent action directly or indirectly by Belem.

Another aspect that is also involved in Ramalho Eanes' planning is closely associated with the internal existence of the political parties, inasmuch as his plan will necessarily go over their heads and, inevitably, in a state of specific and also general weakness. In short, the weakness of the parties relates to the increased opportunities of Ramalho Eanes; in other words, to their submission to a stronger will to control. The weakness of the parties benefits only Eanes and the PC. It is an indirect way of backing the PC.

In other words, the Portuguese population will have to construct the idea, in some way, that the parties themselves cannot come to an agreement or operate mutually unless they are properly restrained and dominated by a single, arbitrary, protective personage.

This is, essentially, a kind of Tito-style personal dictatorship, disguised with the trappings of an ostensibly official democracy. The context that has been presented will involve the matter of the military chiefs, wherein Ramalho Eanes will, in stages, attempt to establish the proponents of his plan in the top military echelons. However, this intention will meet with strong internal and external opposition: the former in the political realm and in the Armed Forces themselves, and the latter in relation to the Western allies, who are certainly following closely the career of a president who has the clearcut, determined support, invulnerable to sophistic arguments, of the Communist Party. In fact, there can be no doubt that Ramalho Eanes will have to pay the PC the price of backing him; as he has already done with Nobre da Costa, when he was ill in the Canary Islands; with Vasco da Gama Fernandez, the present legal adviser of the CR; with J. Letria, spokesman for Belem; and with others that will be disclosed in time.

At the moment, while the normal political process is under way, Eanes is attempting to reach the military area, and hence the articles by Jose Rocha Vieira, in EXPRESSO of 17 January 1981, were not innocent; all the more so because he is a newsman who is, simultaneously, editor of TAL E QUAL, now headed by Mario Zambujal, replacing Letria, who was obviously transferred to Belem. It is, moreover, anticipated that this weekly publication will soon disappear, since it was devised for a short life, essentially in the service of Ramalho Eanes' candidacy.

The top-ranking structure of the Armed Forces after the end of February is now explained, not only in terms of time because, unless the solutions were devised deliberately, nothing would have prevented the chief position of EMGFA from being surrendered at the investiture ceremony for the new term, as would be reasonable to infer from the public commitments assumed by Eanes themselves. Furthermore,

it would be neither credible nor reasonable to agree that 28 February is a magic date, propitious for the most balanced solutions. Time is necessary for all the arrangements because, since 7 December, the president has had more than sufficient time to be able to consider which military chief should replace him as EMGFA.

Hence, the first indicator of the situation relating to Ramalho Eanes' real status lies in the military area. In the political realm, Eanes will attempt to show an image of great institutional reconciliation and cooperation with the other organs of sovereignty.

In this regard, what Ramalho Eanes seeks to achieve at all costs is to create among the public a less receptive attitude toward the possible reduction of the powers of the PR [president of the republic] through the constitutional revision.

Therefore, Eanes, Letria, the Councilors of the Revolution and the other "fellow travelers" will expend their best efforts to prove by A plus B that there is no need to reduce the PR's powers.

If, in spite of everything, this should occur, the public will be led to think that there was personal persecution of R. Eanes on the part of the parties.

Once the constitutional revision has taken place, the period of lull will be over, especially if all his present, far-reaching powers are kept unchanged.

Since it is reasonable to expect that the constitutional revision will be completed within 5 or 6 months, Eanes will then have nearly 4 and a 1/2 years ahead of him to engage in all his action from Belem, using all his trumps, from the Armed Forces, through individuals with personal ties to him, by fostering internal problems and confrontations in the parties, including indirect and covert action in the various fields of national activity that are most important, an action wherein the news media will be widely used, insofar as possible.

Thus, the psychological activity and the Eanes-Letria connection will have extensive leeway for developing and acting.

This is the strategy which will be put into effect, maliciously and surreptitiously, for the attainment of unadmitted ends. It will not be difficult to counter, unless we admit to collective blindness!

2909

CSO: 3101

## DEFENSE MINISTER ANNOUNCES PLAN FOR 'TASK FORCE'

Rome IL BORGHESE in Italian 8 Feb 81 pp 335-337

[Article by Carlo de Biase: "Lagorio Has Opted for a Task Force:"]

[Text] Since 1970, even before the army, under the impetus of the PCI, complicated the inertia and incompetence of the Christian Democratic ministers who took over the Defense Ministry, and was crushed by a vile disciplinary regulation, an illogical reorganization and, finally, the re-exhuming, after 70 years with the COBAR, COIR and COGER (names more suitable for frozen-food products than the military) of the soviets which, created in the Soviet Union by Lev Davidovich Trotskiy, were subsequently suppressed in 1924 when M. F. Frunze, creator of the Soviet General Staff, termed them "detrimental to the most elementary discipline," we have been asking various generals these questions (see IL BORGHESE No 4 of 25 January 1970): "What is now our army's role? Of what is it composed? And, especially, what are its duties? These are questions which, because of an absolute lack of precise data and exhaustive information, cannot be easily answered." And we have gone on to say: "Whereas in major international problems we want to have our say on everything and everyone with the pretentiousness and haughtiness of the superpowers, we have no weight in the military sphere and can be compared with the developing countries of Africa. And, you can be sure, efficient armies are, and for some time will continue to be, useful and productive, for they provide security, a commodity as useful as bread, penicillin and books."

We do not like to say: "We told you so" (and we could add: "for some time now"); however, we cannot fail to express profound satisfaction in learning that the General Staff, finally awakening from a long sleep, like Snow White, after 11 years, has answered our questions through Gen Eugenio Rambaldi, head of the army's General Staff, speaking out on the crucial topics of our defense; that is, on those which pertain to our national strategy and the relative use to be made of our army. And the answer has been given, emphasizing with correct strategic and, we would say, youthful vision, "how extremely important it is for Italy to begin to speak of military policy, national strategy and a doctrine covering the utilization of our land forces, all topics basic to our defense." Almost answering all our questions repeatedly asked from 1970 on, Gen Eugenio Rambaldi has truthfully recognized that: "Up to now, discussion of military problems in Italy has been restricted to important aspects but, in substance, to those of a subordinate nature. Attention has turned principally to personnel problems: (Author's note: Among

other things, we have learned from the same defense minister that military representation, that is, the soviets, is not functioning despite the expenditure of many millions.); whereas, on a few occasions, discussion has turned to the reason for defense and the strategic and doctrinal criteria pertinent thereto. The definition of these criteria," the head of the army's General Staff went on to say, "leads to the solution of all other problems and is essential for giving a valid answer to the question: What is expected of the armed forces?"

In answer to General Rambaldi's question, we would say first of all that, in the absence of any valid strategic alternative, the general staff would do well to seek inspiration in our strategic and operational plans designed along the lines of "advance defense," discarding the alternative solutions proposed by communist deputies or by former Comdr Falco Accame, now socialist deputy, to "regionalize our defense (in more technical terms, rearguard types of defense or territorial defense) and activate a people's war, recreating in Italy those conditions--in case of armed conflict--which made it possible for Romania, and still more, Yugoslavia, in World War II, to mobilize partisan guerrillas, thus transforming the conflict into a people's war. To be still clearer in explaining what the Marxists want, that is, "the controlled dilution of forces," we shall define this concept with the organizational-tactical-logistical nomenclature used by the General Staff: "Territorial war must be conducted by units which permit themselves to be overtaken by the enemy in order, subsequently, to help break down the enemy's operational capability behind the lines."

And here, another question arises: If this type of warfare is not valid, why do the leftists advocate it? The answer is very simple: Adopting the territorial type of defense or warfare, we would be forced to abandon NATO, for we would be operating with a strategy contrary to what we accepted as members of the Atlantic Alliance. We shall go further in illustrating the bad faith of the leftists who advocate territorial defense: there is no major Western country which considers this defense valid and, therefore, even rejecting the current military policy and wishing to defend ourselves with just our own national forces (in this regard, many studies have been made by Gen Luigi Salatiello), it would be very difficult for a strategy based on territorial defense to guarantee our country's integrity.

Territorial defense having been discarded, Defense Minister Lagorio asserted before the committee on NATO problems, a subcommittee of the Chamber of Deputy's Defense Commission, that "it is difficult to conceive of a strategy" which is different from that initiated by the Atlantic Alliance, that is, the one militarily defined as "advance defense" and which, in less military but more understandable terms, means: defense connected with a specific border area. This strategy conforms perfectly with the following three basic elements: the geographical factor; possible threats against our territory; and our country's demographic, economic and technological possibilities. It is naturally objected that our units, scattered along the frontier, could be surprised by an unexpected attack and that "advance defense" could leave other areas of our territory open to a possible attack by airborne or amphibian troops which would outflank our forces. But this is probably not possible, and the reasons for this are contained in concepts expressed by the head of the army's general staff in an illustrative report on the doctrinal position of the general staff relative to the crucial aspects of our



defense which, being in our possession, we are able to relate without divulging any military secret. General Rambaldi states: "Contrary to repeated affirmations, the Italian Army's peace-keeping movement is well-founded. Besides the 5 Alpine brigades stationed in halo formation in the Alps from the Julians to the Marittima, of the 19 remaining active brigades only 4 are stationed east of the Tagliamento [River], while 3 are stationed between the Tagliamento and Piave rivers, 6 in Lombardy, Emilia and Piedmont, and the other 6 in the rest of the peninsula south of the so-called Gothic Line. This formation, also considering that of the tactical and logistic support units, gives our defense maximum flexibility. No solution can logically be excluded. We must always be able to face up to the worst case. Even the second objection, that which states that the country's peninsular area is unprotected and that "advance defense" could be threatened by airborne or amphibian forces, is totally unfounded. To imagine that the same thing could happen in Italy as happened in Ogaden where helicopter forces threatened the Somali defenses is completely unrealistic. To compare our situation with Afghanistan is ridiculous. An airborne attack is possible only under conditions of absolute superiority and is postulated on a rapid reunion with land forces. Even the most powerful airborne bridgeheads cannot be kept in supplies for very long by air: they could not receive shipments of heavy equipment or even necessary supplies. On the other hand, amphibian forces are not very reliable, and their numbers cannot be substantially increased even over the medium term. In any case, they could be used en masse only if they have complete control over the sea and only in the conquest of secondary objectives within the framework of a strategic maneuver conducted by land."

To give greater validity to the strategic aspect of the advance defense system, we would have to fill--and with a certain degree of urgency--a very serious gap in our army: the lack of a task force, that is, in less technical but clearer terms, a force for prompt action; a gap whose solution was officially announced by the defense minister.

And here, difficulties begin. Communist deputies, those of the PDUP [Proletarian Unity Party], and the unfailing Deputy Falco Accame, who always consider the responsibilities of the army in terms of their own interests (which are not always clear), their suspicions and their fears, immediately rose up against the initiative proposed by the general staff and rapidly and intelligently approved by Defense Minister Lagorio, to whom, although far from being on our side, credit must be given on this occasion for having concerned himself more with our nation's defense than with the ever deceitful interests of the obtuse Marxists.

What is a task force? We shall describe it in the clearest terms: it is a military force of prompt action, highly mobile, capable of reaching its objective in the shortest possible time and composed of morally and physically sound troops, with autonomous logistic means, the most modern individual arms and special training for any type of combat. This having been said, it is easy to imagine that the Italian task force should be made up of the San Marco and Lagunari battalions and the magnificent Folgore Paratroop Brigade which, itself being a small army made up of the Tuscania Paratroop Carabinieri Battalion, the 2d Tarquinia Paratroop Battalion, the 5th El Alamein Paratroop Battalion, the 9th Col Moschin Assault Battalion, the 185th Field-Artillery Regiment, the Logistic Battalion, the Command and Transmission



Company, the 26th Light Aviation Squadron Group of the Glove Army, an anti-tank company, a reconnaissance company and, lastly, the Pioneer Paratroop Corps. A small army, we have said, and we want to add: valorously commanded by a general; perfectly and technically trained, disciplined and especially not corrupt.

Moreover, advance defense and the creation of a task force do not exclude recourse to guerrilla warfare or to so-called people's war (or popular war) carried on over a long period of time in territories eventually occupied by the enemy, a useful combining of conventional forces. Even on this subject, Gen Eugenio Rambaldi, head of the army's general staff, spoke with great clarity in his report. Let us see what he said: "Guerrilla warfare is being considered in our defense concept; but it is considered an integrative means, not an alternative or substitution for conventional border defense. The Italian Army is composed of a solid nucleus of Alpine troops which, through tradition, training and weaponry, are particularly suited for carrying on guerrilla warfare in the broad Alpine and pre-Alpine strip. The various units, still effective in not having been attacked by the enemy who will have gravitated to the plain or by groups of enemy forces attacking from behind the lines, are able to regroup rapidly and continue the combat with conventional guerrilla-type methods."

Leftist newspapers, acting in bad faith, have depicted the strategic concepts suggested by the general staff to the defense minister as being new; "downright revolutionary" was the term they applied to the idea of establishing a task force in Italy. It is not unlikely that recent provocations by the communists against the paratroopers in Pisa were, for obvious reasons, skillfully arranged by someone who knew what Minister Lagorio was about to announce. The truth is that the strategic initiative of our armed forces, as described, is not only not new, but even less, revolutionary. It is simply in keeping with the commitments we made to the Atlantic Alliance and is the most suitable means for defending our fatherland. It is occurring several years late and for this reason, and only for this reason, it appears as something new.

We are aware that our defense leaders (at least, this is how it appears) want somehow to make up for lost time and prevent our military organization from completely collapsing. With this hope in mind, it now behooves our government to resolve the most urgent problems regarding personnel, weaponry, training, discipline and the military spirit. Especially the last two, for, without them, regardless of the weaponry, people are no more than a docile flock of sheep, deprived of all military capability. "We consider," Gustave Le Bon writes, "those writers and public speakers who strive to destroy the military spirit in our people's hearts the country's worst enemies, dangerous criminals. If the time comes when this spirit is annihilated, we shall have nothing more to lose. Any enemy invasion would put an end to our history."

8568

CSO: 3104

## SUMMARY OF CURRENTLY COMMISSIONED SHIPS IN NAVAL FLEET

Stuttgart MARINE-RUNDSCHAU in German Feb 81 pp 73-80

[Article by Jose Luis Alcofar Nassaes: "The Portuguese Navy Since 1945"]

[Excerpt] Table 2:

The Portuguese Fleet at the end of 1980

## 4 frigates of the Comandante Riviere class

Comandante Hermenegildo Capelo	F-481 )	At. et Ch.
Comandante Joao Belo	F-480 )	Nantes
Comandante Roberto Ivens	F-482 )	1965-69
Comandante Sacadura Cabral	F-483 )	

Weight: Standard - 1990 tons. Fully equipped--2,330 tons

## 3 United States Destroyer Escorts (frigates) of the Dealey Class

Almirante Gago Coutinho	F-473 )	Shipyards
Almirante Magalhaes Correa	F-474 )	Navais Lisnave,
Almirante Pereira da Silva	F-472 )	Lisbon, and
		Viana do Castelo

Weight: Standard--1,450 tons. Fully equipped--1,914 t. (1962-1968)

## 6 Korvette Destroyers of the Joao Coutinho Class

Antonio Enes	F-471 )	Empresa Nacional
Augusto de Castilho	F-484 )	Bazan. El Ferrol
Honorio Barreto	F-485 )	(1968-1975)
General Pereira D'Eca	F-477 )	
Jacinto Candido	F-476 )	Blohm & Voss
Joao Coutinho	F-475 )	AG, Hamburg

Weight: Standard--1,203 tons. Fully equipped--1,380 tons

## 4 Korvettes of the Improved Joao Coutinho Class

Joao Roby	F-487 )	Empresa Nacional
Oliveira E. Carmo	F-489 )	Bazan. El Ferrol
Alfonso Cerqueira	F-488 )	(1972-1975)
Baptista de Andrade	F-486 )	

Weight: Standard--1,203 tons. Fully equipped--1,380 tons

# 11 Patrolers

Sao Nicolao (ex P-8)

P-589

Normand (Le  
Havre) 1955

Weight: Standard-- 366 tons. Fully equipped-- 400 tons.

# 10 of the Cacine Class

Cacine

P-1140)

Cunene

P-1141)

Arsenal of Alfeite

Cuanza

P-1144)

and Shipyard

Geba

P-1145)

Navais do

Limpopo

P-1160)

Mondego

Mandovi

P-1142)

(1969-72)

Rovuma

P-1143)

Save

P-1161)

Zaire

P-1146)

Zambeze

P-1147)

Weight: Standard-- 292 tons. Fully equipped-- 310 tons.

# 3 Submarines of the Daphne Class

Albacora

S-163 )

Dubigeon

Barracuda

S-164 )

Normandy

Delfim

S-166 )

1965-69 Nantes

Weight: Standard-- 700 tons. Surfaced-- 869 tons. Submerged--1,043 tons.

# 14 Patrolboats

Argos

P-372 )

Arsenal of Alfeite

Centauro

P-1130)

of Lisbon and

Dragao

P-374 )

Shipyard Navais

Hidra

P-376 )

do Viana do Castelo

Sagitario

P-1137)

(1963-65)

Weight: Standard-- 180 tons. Fully equipped-- 210 tons.

Acor

P-1163)

Arsenal of Alfeite,

Agua

P-1165)

Lisbon

Albatroz

P-1162)

(1974-75)

Andorinha

P-1164)

Cisne

P-1167)

Condor

P-1166)

Weight: 45 tons

Castor

P-580

Shipyard Navais  
do Mondego (1964)

Weight: 22 tons

Regulus

P-369

James Taylor  
Shipbuilders (1961)

Weight: 18 tons

Rio Minho	P-370	Arsenal of Alfeite, Lisbon (1955-57)
Weight: 14 tons		

4 Coastal Mine Sweepers, Ton Class

Lagoa	M-403 )	
Ribeira Grande	M-402 )	CUF Shipyard
Rosario	M-404 )	Lisbon 1954-56
Sau Roque	M-401 )	
Weight: Standard-- 394 tons. Fully equipped-- 450 tons.		

1 Boat for Protection of the Fishing Fleet

Bicuda	P-596	Alfeite Arsenal
Weight: Standard-- 230 tons. Fully equipped-- 275 tons. Lisbon (1941)		

8 Assault Boats

Alabarda	LDG-202)	Shipyard
Bombarda	LDG-201)	Navais do Mondego
Montante	LDG-104)	(1965-71)
Bacamarte	LDG-105)	
Weight: 500 tons.		

LDP 100  
LDM 119  
LDM 120  
LDM 121

Others: Alfonso de Albuquerque (ex Dalrymple) 1944-45, 1,590 tons, surveying ship; Pedro Nunes, 1931-34, 1,162 tons, surveying ship; Dom Aleixo, 1966, 60 tons, surveying ship; Cacheu (ex Almeida Carvalho, ex US Kellar), 1961-64, 1,200 tons, surveying ship; Mira (ex Formalhaut, ex Arrabida), 23 tons; Sao Gabriel, 1963, 9,000 tons Standard, fleet tanker; Sao Rafael (ex US Portunus), 1944, 743 tons Standard; Sagres (ex Guanabara, ex Albert Leo Schlageter), 1937, 1,725 tons Standard, sail training ship; Xavier Schultz, 1970, 900 tons, tugboat, Bojentender.

9328  
CSO: 3103

## BRIEFS

NEORION SHIPYARDS--The Greek Government and the Soviets as well seem to be reluctant to renew the Neorion Shipyard contract signed in 1979, which concerns primarily the repair of Russian Merchant Navy vessels. The fact that the Soviets have turned a blind eye to the contract, using Neorion mostly for the repair of their auxiliary naval ships, and on the other part the desire of the Neorion administration to stop serving such Soviet needs has led to a new approach on the subject. Obviously NATO is not disinterested in such activities at Neorion, and the USA has many times in the past expressed its disapproval of the contract. Of course, dissolving the USSR-Neorion cooperation will cause the Opposition to raise its voice once again against the American bases in Greece, and even more would intensify the Communist Party strike activities. It is significant to note that during the last year or so, these activities have decreased to the minimum. Perhaps it is to be expected that the Neorion contract will take new dimensions, particularly if no strong government appears after the forthcoming elections. [Text] [Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 4 Mar 81 p 2]

CSO: 4920



## ECEVIT BECOMES EDITORIAL ADVISER TO NEW MAGAZINE

Ankara BRIEFING in English 9 Mar 81 pp 10-12

[Text] Mr Ecevit, as all the world knows, was a poet and a journalist, before becoming a politician. With all organised political activity now suspended, he is now channelling his energies into the production of a weekly magazine covering all aspects of Turkish life. Entitled ARAYIS--which may roughly be translated as THE QUEST or THE SEARCH--it appeared for the first time on Saturday, 21 February.

How much impact it will make remains to be seen; to many professional observers, its inaugural issues seemed too abstruse and too theoretical to appeal to the ordinary reader. What the journalistic trade calls "curiosity sales" are reported to have been high -- many people will buy a new magazine, especially one edited by an eminent public figure, just to see what it is like -- but establishing a solid, regular readership is another matter.

Mr. Ecevit's position is given as "Editorial Coordinator" which in English terms seems to mean a kind of Editor-in-Chief. Though many of the articles are unsigned, they bear the unmistakable impress of Mr. Ecevit's thinking. Editorially, he is obviously the mastermind.

Commercially, however, the magazine is believed to have been financed by Mr. Aydin Dogan, who gained control of MILLIYET about a year ago and who has had entrepreneurial links with the KOC Empire. There has been no detectable ideological affinity between Mr. Dogan and Mr. Ecevit in the past, but these days that does not seem to matter; after all, there is no detectable ideological or cultural affinity between Mr. Tiny Rowland of LONRHO and the top editors of the

So far ARAYIS's criticisms of the military regime have been veiled and oblique rather than explicit and a popular reaction is that "if that is all the magazine has to say, the ruling generals have nothing to worry about." In the first issue Mr. Ecevit, in a hand-signed editorial, dilated on the theme of Ataturkism. "No one can conceive that Ataturk advocated mono-dialogue (i.e. one person speaking while the other person always listens) in society, in politics, and in thought.

And no one can conceive that Ataturkism means mono-dialogue or even

silence." This Delphic pronouncement can be interpreted by the reader any way he chooses.

In his second signed editorial, on 28 February, Mr. Ecevit is slightly less arcane. ...There is no turning back. Turkey has passed the point of no return ... Democracy, which suffered an accident, will be repaired, and will carry on ...

"This will be possible provided that the masses do not expect everything to come from the top...What is necessary is a quest, not an expectation. Democracy should now grow from the soil of the nation instead of being planted in a vase.

"We should resurrect democracy..not to be at variance with the army but to deserve the right to live in a regime which is best suited to the dignity of man ... we should repair and cultivate democracy, which we destroyed with our own hands."

(This is not presented as blank verse.)

Criticism of ARAYIS has come from only two publications — the Istanbul daily SON HAVADIS, a conservative newspaper, and the bi-weekly news

In an unsigned article in YENI FORUM, Ecevit is accused of trying to pull Turkey out of NATO and push it into the non-aligned bloc, of mortgaging Turkish industry to DISK, and the educational institutions to marxist teachers.

Though ARAYIS can be compared to the old AKIS and the new YANKI in terms of its content and format, it is more in the style of YENI FORUM because of

its analytic interpretations and literary articles, most of its contributors are university professors.

YENI FORUM says that an unsigned article in ARAYIS (which is believed to have been written by Ecevit) gives some idea about the editorial policy of the magazine. This article, entitled "The world crisis and the quest" homes the message (according to YENI FORUM) that "if we are keeping silent today, don't be mistaken that things will go on like this". YENI FORUM believes this message is a kind of warning to certain quarters. YENI FORUM adds the piquant comment that ARAYIS is perhaps a unique magazine, the like of which has never been seen in Turkey or anywhere else.

#### The Constitutional Question

In a slightly more analytical article in ARAYIS's first issue, Professor Munci Kapani of Ankara University writes that if a truly democratic constitution is to be created, it will have to be bound by the principles of universal human rights and the principles of law. The constituent power (i.e., the Assembly) must reflect the wishes of public opinion and take into account the expectations of the masses. If it fails to do these things, the constitution that will emerge will run counter to the realities of society and will be short-lived.

Ideally speaking, the constituent assembly should be elected by the people. But under the present circumstances, this may not be possible. The most appropriate thing would therefore be to create an assembly that is as representative as possible.

If the assembly is to be closed to members of political parties, this could be interpreted as a violation of human rights and could render the assembly ineffective, casting a shadow over its representative character.

The writer also criticises, albeit in circumspect language, the formula enunciated by General Evren, whereby the Constituent Assembly will have some of the functions of a lower house while the ruling National Security Council will act as an Upper House imbued with ultimate sovereignty. This formula, the article suggests, is not compatible with the principles of democracy. An arbitration board, the writer advocates, should be created to settle possible differences between the Assembly and the National Security Council (or Upper House).

All this is clever academic theorising, but is light years away from the real thinking of the generals. The National Security Council clearly plans to retain ultimate sovereignty in its hands for a few years, and well-meaning liberal theorists like Mr. Ecevit and Prof. Kapani will simply have to lump it.

Though there is little so far in ARAYIS which need alarm the generals, they will scrutinise its future is-

ues carefully. One factor which may give them concern is the presence of so many extreme leftist intellectuals in Mr. Ecevit's editorial team. For example, the writer on labour affairs is Associate Professor Alpaslan Isikli, a former adviser to DISK— whose leading activists are now awaiting trial in Istanbul for alleged involvement in attempts to set up a Marxist state.

Several of the articles are unsigned — which suggests to sharp-eyed observers that the author is Mr. Ecevit himself. In format the publication roughly resembles that of YANKI, but in editorial policy and in political interpretation the two weeklies seem markedly different.

But YENI FORUM disagrees with this conclusion of BRIEFING, arguing that the two magazines are alike, except that ARAYIS lacks the sex stories that readers find every week in YANKI.

But perhaps the most hurtful criticism of Mr. Ecevit's magazine is that it lacks a sense of realism. Mr. Ecevit still seems to be searching for a dream world, which even in the plenitude of his political power he could never render meaningful to his compatriots. ARAYIS -- The Quest: or perhaps *à la recherche du temps perdu*.

CSO: 4920

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